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ABSTRACT 
Threat serves as an impetus in the foundation, development, revitalization, and waning of 
the contemporary Philippine-United States alliance. Using Stephen Walt’s balance of 
threat theory as the analytical framework, this study proves that, historically, the 
dynamics of the Philippine-U.S. alliance revolves around the interaction of threat-centric 
issues and the member-state’s response. Threat serves as the prime mover of the alliance; 
foreign aid, ideological solidarity, and institutional penetration do not guarantee the 
alliance stability. They do, however, serve as critical factors in the alliance management. 
Shared or unshared existential threats with external overtones have a greater impact on 
the alliance. Moreover, internal security threats affect alliance efficiency. A coordinated 
approach is needed to confront and master them.  
The Philippine Communist Insurgency of the CPP-NPA-NDF, the South China 
Sea Dispute with China, the ambiguity of 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty provisions 
including its executory mechanisms, and U.S. “strategic ambivalence” in the case of 
conflict serve as disconnecting factors of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. These factors 
created and continue to create friction between the Philippines and the United States. This 
study recommends that the allies must align their threat assessments, resolve or manage 
disconnecting threats, and then address the ambiguity of the agreement through further 
research and deeper strategic discourse. 
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The Republic of the Philippines (PH) and the United States (U.S.) maintain close 
security relations forged by the four decades of U.S. colonization of the Philippines 
(1898–1946), extensive military cooperation, and a bilateral security alliance.1 The 
security partnership’s history traces from the onset of the Spanish-American War (1898–
1902), through World War II (1941–1945), the Korean War (1950–1953), the Vietnam 
War (1964–1975), the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), the Iraq War (2003–2004), and 
today’s Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The contemporary Philippine-U.S. alliance 
evolved from a strategic military partnership into a formal one. The signing of the 1951 
Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippine and United States representatives 
formalized the alliance. The MDT guarantees the protection of the two nations’ common 
strategic and economic interests. Significantly, the member states are obligated for a 
mutual defense in case of foreign aggression. The MDT and its mechanisms provide an 
opportunity for the Philippines and the United States to pursue both their respective and 
shared strategic interests. Together, The Philippines and the United States continue to 
face the challenge of existential traditional and non-traditional threats via their bilateral 
security alliance. Currently, the U.S. designates the Philippines as a major non-North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally.2 
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Imagine two skillful dancers dancing passionately, but clumsily, they keep 
stepping on each other’s shoes. Their individual skill is unquestionable but because one 
prefers hip-hop and the other ballroom, their unshared passion for tango makes them 
uncoordinated. The security relationship between the Philippines and the United States is 
comparable to two skillful but uncoordinated dancers. Both states dance in their 
                                                 
1 Thomas Lum and Ben Dolven, “The Republic of The Philippines and U.S. Interests-2014,” Current 
Politics and Economics of South, Southeastern, and Central Asia 23, no. 2 (2014), 1. 
2 George W. Bush, “Memorandum on Designation of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally,” 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, October 13, 2003, 1337. 
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respective shoes, but presently they are uncoordinated. As partners, both must attempt 
greater coordination to better face the music.  
Tied by the bilateral alliance, the United States and the Philippines jointly 
confront various threat-centric concerns in the domestic, regional, and in the global 
security realm. Historically, threats serve as an impetus in the establishment and 
development of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. The alliance continues to challenge the 
onslaught of varied forms of traditional and non-traditional threats. Presently, the 
Philippine-U.S. alliance focuses on resolving the existential threat of China’s assertive 
expansionism in the South China Sea (SCS), and the curbing of Islamic terrorism in 
Southern Philippines as part of the U.S. GWOT. However, the Philippines and the United 
States reveal an unshared threat in their alliance threat-assessment priority. 
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH) views internal security 
conflicts as the foremost national security interest, followed by external security threats.3 
At present, the Philippines confront four existential security threats. First, the Communist 
Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front (CNN) 
continues to wage a nationwide protracted communist insurgency that seeks to overthrow 
the GPH. Second, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) attempts to secede from the 
Philippines to form a Bangsamoro state in Southern Mindanao. Third, the Al-Qaeda-
linked (AQ) Islamic terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) continues to advocate the 
establishment of an Islamic caliphate using extreme coercive violence and banditry. 
Fourth, China’s Asia-Pacific expansion and its assertive encroachment on Philippine 
sovereignty threaten its national interest and territorial integrity. Of the three internal 
security threats, the GPH defines the resilient CNN as the top internal security threat.4 
The CNN continues to wage an enduring protracted political and armed struggle with the 
intention of supplanting the existing Philippine democratic ideology with a totalitarian 
communist state.5 The CNN continues to challenge the GPH through a nationwide 
                                                 
3 National Economic and Development Authority, “Peace and Security,” in Philippine Development 
Plan 201–2016 (Pasig, Philippines: National Economic and Development Authority, 2011), 293–294.  
4 Armed Forces of the Philippines, “Strategic Environment,” in Internal Peace and Security Plan: 
Bayanihan (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2011), 10. 
5 Ibid. 
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violent armed struggle and unified political offensive in the socio-political domain 
threatening the Philippines internal security stability. On the matter of external security 
concerns, the GPH actively opposes the assertive expansionism of China in the SCS 
through diplomatic and legal means. For several decades now, China has continually 
challenged the Philippines through encroachment activities and active military overtures. 
Its action of occupying reefs and shoals within Philippine’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) threatens the latter’s territorial integrity and economic sources. China’s maritime 
dominance subjugates the Philippines’ ability to protect its territorial integrity and the 
EEZ. Its active imposition of control on the SCS through confrontational strategy poses a 
potential risk in the escalation of conflict. The China threat exists as a prime external 
security interest of the Philippines. 
The primary security concerns of the United States in the region are the Chinese 
Asia-Pacific expansion and the GWOT. China’s persistent aggressive expansionism and 
military adventurism in the SCS threaten regional security, freedom of navigation, and 
challenges for U.S. allies. For instance, Chinese aggressive expansionism is evident in its 
imposition of the so-called ‘nine-dash line.’ Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia 
Daniel Russel testified before the U.S. Congress in February 2014 that it was “an 
incremental effort by China to assert control over the area contained in the so-called 
‘nine-dash line.’6 In addition, China’s one-sided declaration of an East China Sea Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) threatens freedom of navigation.7 China’s military 
adventurism directly challenges U.S. military naval forces. In 2009, five Chinese military 
vessels swarmed and harassed the USNS Impeccable in the SCS forcing the latter to make 
an emergency stop, and recently, a provocative Chinese action culminated in a near-
collision on December 5, 2014, when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy 
vessel tried to block the USS Cowpens, a naval military cruiser.8 This chain of events 
triggered the strategic pivot of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2012, the 
                                                 
6 Lum and Doven, The Republic of The Philippines and the U.S. Interest-2014, 17. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Simon Denyer and William Wan, “U.S. Complains to China after Warships Narrowly Avoided 




U.S. Strategic Guidance articulated a strategic shift towards the Asia Pacific region, 
focused on maintaining regional access and rebalancing the power, but most importantly 
to strengthen existing Asian alliances.9 In addition, the United States continues to focus 
on the GWOT aiding the GPH in its war against the AQ-linked local and transnational 
Islamic terrorist networks operating in the Southern Philippines.  
The Philippine-U.S. alliance shows a gap in its joint threat assessment priority. 
The alliance partners have a differing perspective on target priority. At present, Islamic 
terrorism and Chinese expansionism are the central threat concerns for the alliance. The 
resilient CNN’s nationwide communist insurgency remains a less significant priority for 
the alliance that establishes a gap. Based on this context, this study raises several 
questions, including: “What factor disconnects the Philippines and the United States in 
their bilateral security alliance? What is the role of threat in the dynamics of the 
alliance?” 
B. IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSE 
States join alliances for a definite purpose. For whatever those purposes, states 
form alliances to satisfy shared and respective interests. However, states must be aware 
that in an alliance, members undertake an individual level of responsibility and 
commitment in the pursuit of a shared objective for the good of the alliance. A disparity 
in the stated purpose, or uncoordinated actions, may prove disastrous to the alliance. 
When the formation and management of the alliance revolves around threats, the parties 
in an alliance must determine and acknowledge shared and unshared threats and their 
consequential disconnecting factors. The acknowledgment of the alliance gaps by both 
parties serve as stimuli in the alignment of the alliance’s threat assessments that 
facilitates the reformulation of joint strategies. In connection with this, the alliance 
established mechanisms could be further refined and formulated into new ones as a 
measure to counter the effect of threats among both nations. This step ensures that the 
alliance is functioning efficiently and that gaps and disconnecting factors are addressed. 
                                                 
9 Leon E. Panetta et al., “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” 
Dept. of Defense, http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo18079; http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo18079 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 
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This study provides additional knowledge on the dynamics of the contemporary 
Philippine-U.S. alliance, and focuses on explaining the role of threat on its formation and 
management. This study highlights the existential threats and the disconnecting factors 
affecting the relationship between the Philippines and the United States. Through the 
determination of the role of threat and the disconnecting factors of the alliance, this study 
provides a suggested path the Philippines and the United States should pursue on 
strengthening the alliance or downgrading the alliance into a strategic-type partnership. In 
addition, this study can serve as a catalyst in conducting in-depth studies to focus on the 
issues discovered.  
C. MAIN ARGUMENT 
Threat serves as an impetus in the foundation and development of the alliance. 
The existence of the threat influences the management of the alliance. The presence of 
shared threats obligates states to enter into an alliance in which they jointly act to 
maximize security by aggregating their capacities. States in alliance formalize 
agreements to legalize collective undertakings in pursuit of shared goals. They create 
mechanisms to serve as shields and swords in confronting the challenges posed by the 
existential security threats and from constitution-based problems. Moreover, the 
management of an alliance requires the continuous creation, reformulation, and 
institutionalization of mechanisms to maintain the integrity of the alliance and maximize 
its use. This study argues that an unshared existential security threat and shared threat 
approached unilaterally, or in an uncoordinated manner, creates a gap in the alliance 
threat assessment that affects the overall efficiency of the alliance. Furthermore, these 
unresolved alliance issues influence the established mechanisms that further disconnect 
the alliance. This study further asserts that the Philippines and the United States should 
approach the issues contentiously, but in a synchronized manner. They should strive to 
align the alliance threat assessment, address the ambiguity of the provisions of the MDT, 
and continue to reformulate established mechanisms to address the alliance ambivalence. 
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D. THEORETICAL APPROACH OF THE ANALYSIS 
In understanding the occurrences of conflicts in the international arena, various 
schools of thought compete to profess their expertise. Numerous published academic 
works on the formation and management of alliances influenced by threats exemplify the 
broad acceptance of the study of alliance. However, the abundance of scholarly materials 
on the study of alliances does not guarantee that a single grand alliance theory exists to 
explain the phenomenon comprehensively. Nonetheless, some literature is worthy of 
scrutiny.  
When is an alliance an alliance? In his article, “The Concept of Alliance,” Stefan 
Bergsmann came up with a unique definition of the alliance “as an explicit agreement 
among states in the realm of national security in which the partners promise mutual 
assistance in the form of a substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain 
contingency the arising of which is uncertain.”10 This context highlights the core 
elements of military alliances; it provides a definition and limitation of an alliance. 
Nevertheless, the central question of how alliances are formed and managed remains 
unanswered. 
Alliance formation happens when states view the world as anarchic. States join 
alliances to mitigate or balance a threatening power in order to survive. States react to the 
presence of existential threats that influence them to join or form alliances. In Politics 
Among Nations, Hans J. Morgenthau asserts that in the international politics, the struggle 
for power dictates the behavior of states.11 In power politics, the world is anarchic in 
nature, and what matters most is the survival of the state.12 This assertion has become a 
central paradigm among the circles of international relations theorists and policy makers. 
The popularity of the theory surged when the United States applied the containment 
strategy, a practical application of the framework of realism, against the Soviet Union 
                                                 
10 Stefan Bergsmann, “The Concept of Military Alliance,” in Small States and Alliances, eds. Erich 
Reiter and Heinz Gärtner, 2001 ed., Vol. V (Heidelberg, Germany: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 2001), 29. 
11 Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and W. David Clinton, Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed., rev. by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton ed. (Boston, 
MA: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006), 703. 
12 Ibid. 
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during the Cold War.13 Moreover, in Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz 
stipulates that the determinant of the behaviors of states depends on the structure of the 
international system.14 He explains that the global structure influences the behavior of the 
states, not the will of the people. In this case, the state action and the global structure 
continue to complement each other in shaping the international system that sways the 
formation and management of alliances. In addition, in The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics, John J. Mearsheimer advances the idea that the constant interactions of security 
and power between strategic states promote competition purposely to strengthen their 
relative power.15 States continue to strengthen themselves, even in the absence of a direct 
threat, to satisfy their insecurity with other states within the international system. To 
maintain the status quo in the anarchic world, states focus their respective priorities to 
counter the threats of other states, which in turn compel them to join the alliance.  
In the Origins of Alliances, Stephen M. Walt provides a better explanation of how 
threat induces the formation of the alliance and on how states respond to threats. He 
presents the balance of threat theory, a different perspective in the creation and 
management of alliances wherein he argues that the dynamics between threats and the 
responses of affected states are the primary factors in this occurrence. In laying out his 
theory, Walt defines alliance as security collaboration between two or more sovereign 
states in a formal or informal manner in which they undertake some level of obligation 
and in which reciprocity of benefits exists for both parties; the failure to honor the 
agreement or severing the relationship even with the existence of compensation would 
entail a certain cost.16 In this case, alliance formation and management comprise the sum 
of interacting external factors and internal undertakings between parties in agreement. 
Walt asserts that alliance formation predominantly occurs as a result of states 
balancing against threats, and not by the reason of balancing of power; in which states 
                                                 
13 Brian A. Keaney, “The Realism of Hans Morgenthau” (master’s thesis, University of South 
Florida), 1–81. 
14 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
15 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 555. 
16 Stephen M. Walt, “Exploring Alliance Formation,” in The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1987e), 1. 
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choose allies because of the gravity of threat posed by another state, regardless of the 
adversary state’s current power status.17 This occurrence is merited to the point that more 
states tend to balance rather than to bandwagon against a threatening state, and 
bandwagoning cases are manifested only by weak and isolated states.18 In addition, the 
influence of ideological distinction as a factor in alliance formation declines as the level 
of threat increases; however, the potency of ideological cohesion increases when the level 
of security is high or there exists a strengthening interdependence between the ideological 
factors and security concerns.19 
Walt clarifies the significance of the balance of threat theory over the balance of 
power theory, citing that it is a refinement of Morgenthau’s traditional balance of power 
theory.20 Walt asserts that the balance of threat theory subsumes the balance of power 
theory for “it provides greater explanatory power with equal parsimony.”21 The balance 
of threat theory validates the formation of a more powerful alliance in response to a 
threatening power and with the intention to balance it. Moreover, the theory explains the 
formation of the alliance as a reaction to the influence of regional dynamics and not on 
the shift in the global balance of power. He clarifies the balance of threat theory as a 
phenomenon of alliance where states ally to balance against threat rather than based on 
power.22 As he explains, states tend to balance against the states that pose the greatest 
threat, irrespective of the power factor.23 He explains that in the balance of power theory 
states form an alliance due to imbalance of power, while in the balance of threat theory 
states react because of an inequity of threat, which drives them to form alliances or 
upgrade their capacity to reduce vulnerability.24 In addition, he asserts that this theory 
                                                 
17 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” in The Origins of 
Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987d), 263. 
18 Ibid., 263. 
19 Ibid. 






explains the formation of alliances depending on the sources and degree of threat factor. 
Threat originates from different sources such as the aggregate power, geographic 
proximity, greater offensive capability, and superior aggressive intentions.25 These 
sources have a relative impact on a state’s decision in forming or joining alliances.26 
Through the balance of threat theory, Walt presents the principles of bandwagoning and 
balancing from the works of Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics, in which 
he gives credit to Stephen Van Evera.27 In addition, Walt cites Arnold Wolfers, who uses 
the same terminology in his balance of power theory in his “Theory and Practice” 
essay.28  
Walt makes several assertions to explain his balance of threat theory. In his first 
assertion, Walt stipulates that in response to the threat, states commit to alliances by 
either balancing or bandwagoning.29 On balancing, a state facing an external threat will 
ally with other states to defy the hostile state.30 In the aspect of bandwagoning, he asserts 
that states confronting a foreign threat will align with the most menacing state. In either 
case, a state’s alignment depends on the following characteristics of a threatening state: 
1) a greater aggregate power; 2) close geographical proximity; 3) greater offensive 
capabilities; and 4) aggressive intentions.31 In addition, a balancing alliance formed in 
wartime conditions will dissolve when the aggressor is defeated, while alliance with the 
bandwagon to oppose a threat normally disbands when the threat becomes serious.32 Walt 
concludes that balancing is more common than bandwagoning.33 
                                                 
25 Stephen M. Walt, “Balancing and Bandwagoning,” in The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1987a), 147. 
26 Ibid., 147–148. 
27 Stephen M. Walt, “Explaining Alliance Formation,” in The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: 




31 Ibid., 21–28. 
32 Ibid., 32−33. 
33 Ibid., 33. 
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Second, he asserts that another possible reason for states to form an alliance is 
ideology. Drawing from Morgenthau’s definition of ideological solidarity, Walt asserts 
that states that share political, cultural, or other traits are likely to become allied and 
influence the formation of the alliance as a response to external threats.34 The alignment 
of states with the same ideology 1) advances the defense of respective political 
principles; 2) alleviates mutual fear among members; 3) enhances the weak state’s 
legitimacy elevated by its alliance with a large and popular movement; and 4) the 
ideology prescribes alignment.35 
Third, Walt argues that foreign aid in the form of economic and military 
assistance contributes to alliance formation.36 The act of providing support demonstrates 
benevolence that suggests a sense of gratitude or dependency on the recipient. Foreign 
aid is a unique type of balancing behavior, and it can serve as a form of control by the 
donor over the recipient.37 It serves as an instrument of statecraft and diplomacy that 
works both ways. 
Finally, the effects of transnational penetration, or in Walt’s definition, the 
intervention, and manipulation of one state in another state’s domestic political system, 
could result in alliance formation.38 Through deception and influence, foreign 
governments manipulate the creation of alliances with targeted states. The penetration’s 
applicability is more efficient to an open-type society than a closed-type society. 
Moreover, the degree of accessibility of the state’s political system dictates the level of 
probability of the alliance formation. 
Walt concludes that the balance of threat theory subsumes the balance of power 
theory, ideological solidarity, foreign aid, and penetration in the formation and 
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management of the alliance.39 He particularly states three main points in the conception 
and management of the alliance. First, where balancing is more common than 
bandwagoning, states form alliances to balance against potential threats rather than 
bandwagoning with the threat source.40 Threat is the primary factor in the formation of an 
alliance where the threat level is governed by the interrelated factors of supremacy, 
proximity, capability, and intention of the threatening state. Second, the ideological 
solidarity has less influence in the alliance formation and acts as a susceptible factor in 
the dissolution of the alliance when subjected to a disinformation action or challenged by 
a significant level of threat.41 In terms of alliance management, the ideological factor 
generates a possible atmosphere of discord rahter than harmony if the member-states 
involved feel unsecured, when sovereignty is sacrificed, and when the presence of a 
divergent ideology creates a dominant menace to legitimacy. Third, foreign aid and 
penetration as instruments in the formation of an alliance are weak elements, specifically 
in the absence of a common interest.42 Foreign aid in the form of economic and military 
assistance serves as a diplomatic instrument but fails in the absence of compatible 
political goals, even with the presence of shared interests.43 However, it tends to increase 
the level of efficiency of existing alliance because it complements their aggregate power. 
Like in the case of penetration, foreign aid does not assure the creation of a reliable ally. 
Likewise, penetration is a weak determinant of alliance formation since its impact is hard 
to measure, and the absence of motives for the alignment adds to the dilemma. 
Walt’s balance of threat theory is the most viable framework of analysis in 
determining the role of threat in the dynamics of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. Through 
this theory, various threats are analyzed regarding how it influences the formation and 
management of the contemporary Philippine-U.S. alliance. This theory relates to this 
study, since threats are the primary movers of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. In addition, 
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the threats affecting the alliance are confined within the scope of national and regional 
level. 
E. THESIS METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
The long-standing partnership between the Philippines and United States does not 
explicitly measure the actual status of the alliance. However, its history is a living 
testament of its dynamics. Imprinted in the alliance history, are significant occurrences 
that show its character. History shows the gaps that concerned parties must address to 
maximize the full potential of the alliance. Taking a cue from history provides a critical 
guide to decision makers, specifically politicians and staff that formulate and implement 
policies and strategies.44 Hence, this thesis will review the evolution of Philippine-United 
States alliance in a historical context to determine the role of threat in the Philippine-U.S. 
alliance. Furthermore, the analysis will find disconnecting factors affecting the alliance. 
The overall approach of this study is an analytical and logical narrative of the Philippine 
and United States history covering the period from the inception of the first Philippine-
U.S. military partnership to the present day alliance. To recognize gaps and explain 
relevant issues, this study will present and analyze empirical evidence based on 
previously published researches and publications. In this study, the author will use the 
three main points of Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory to frame and analyze the 
Philippine-U.S. alliance formation and management.  
The study is presented in four parts. Chapter II highlights the pre-alliance events 
between the Philippines and the United States. It focuses on the foundation and 
development of the Philippine-U.S. military relationship from the Spanish-American War 
to the end of World War II. This chapter highlights the role of threat and the effect of the 
American colonization to the development of the Philippines and U.S. relations. Chapter 
III presents the development and formalization of the military partnership into an 
alliance. This section shows the ebbs and flows of the alliance that led to its 
formalization, its consequential nadir, and revitalization. The chapter shows the 
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interaction of threats and alliance mechanism in shaping the contemporary alliance. 
Chapter IV presents the contemporary security challenges and opportunities of the 
alliance. This part highlights the role of varied existential threats that are presently 
challenging the alliance. It reveals the role of the shared and unshared existential threat in 
the dynamics of the alliance. It also reveals the interaction of threat and the alliance treaty 
and mechanisms affecting the Philippine-U.S. alliance. Chapter V presents the conclusion 
and recommendation of the study. It concludes that the threat impacts the Philippine-U.S. 
alliance in two ways. It either strengthens or weakens the alliance. Threats serve as a 
catalyst in the organization, development, waning, and revitalization of the contemporary 
alliance. This study recommends that to strengthen the alliance, the gap in the alliance 
threat assessment must be resolved between the representatives of the Philippines and the 
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II. THE FOUNDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PHILIPPINE AND UNITED STATES MILITARY PARTNERSHIP  
This chapter highlights the pre-alliance events between the Philippines and the 
United States. It focuses on the foundation and development of the Philippine-U.S. 
military relationship from the Spanish-American War towards the end of World War II. If 
we are to use Walt’s definition of what constitutes an alliance, then this period is 
irrelevant since he defines alliance as an informal or formal agreement between two 
sovereign states. During this period, the Philippines was a colony of Spain, and 
subsequently transferred to the Americans after the Spanish-American War. However, it 
is necessary to include this section because it highlights several main points of Walt’s 
balance of threat theory. From the start, the Philippines and the U.S. manifested alliance-
like activities. This chapter discusses the Philippines and U.S. manifestations of the 
balance of threat theory central points. 
A. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR IN THE PHILIPPINES 
The Philippines and the United States alliance are rooted deeply in history. Since 
the inception of the Philippine-U.S. Alliance, the two nations cooperated in promoting 
their strategic interests especially in confronting common threats. The foundation of the 
alliance spans for centuries that culminated during the Spanish-American War of 1898. 
For almost 350 years, the Philippines remained under Spain’s colonial rule. Spain 
colonized the Philippines in 1565 with the intent to impose Spanish domination and 
exploit the Philippines’ vast natural resources for the benefit of the Spanish crown.45 
Under the Spanish control, the Filipino people suffered forced conscription, forced labor, 
the concentration of wealth among the elite, and the concentration of power among 
priests and their authority over agriculture interests.46 The Spanish colonizers’ harsh rule 
and unfair practices roused the sense of nationalism of the Filipino people. The Filipinos’ 
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clamor for freedom and independence led to numerous historical rebellions against the 
oppressive Spanish authorities in the Philippines.47 
In the latter part of 1897, the natives’ rebellion in Cuba strained diplomatic 
relations between the United States and Spain. The Cuban rebellion prejudiced American 
interests and endangered American residents in that island.48 The mysterious sinking of 
the USS Maine, an American ship docked in Cuba, aggravated the situation. It provided 
President William McKinley and the U.S. Congress reasons for an American intervention 
in Cuban affairs.49 On April 23, 1898, Spain and the United States began withdrawing 
their diplomatic representatives, and a war broke out between the two nations.50 Under 
the Spanish rule, the Philippines became a legitimate target for American conquest. The 
Spanish-American War presented an opportunity for the Filipinos to pursue their quest 
for independence from the clutches of Spain. The Filipinos would capitalize the war and 
use America as an ally to intensify the ongoing insurrection against Spain. Similarly, 
Americans would solicit military cooperation with the Filipino revolutionaries against the 
Spanish forces in the Philippines. 
At the outset of the Spanish-American War, American diplomats started to engage 
with Filipino revolutionary leaders. Spencer Pratt, the American consul in Singapore, 
initiated contact with the Filipino revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo.51 Consul Pratt 
urged Aguinaldo to resume hostilities against the Spaniards, and in return, the United 
States would recognize the independence of the Philippines.52 However, the agreement 
remains undocumented since Mr. Pratt guaranteed Aguinaldo that his word and that of 
Commodore George Dewey, Commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, “constitute a solemn 
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pledge that their verbal promises and assurances would be fulfilled to the letter.”53 With 
this promise, Aguinaldo conferred with Rounseville Wildman, the American Consul-
General in Hong Kong, about proceeding with the procurement and delivery of arms and 
ammunitions worth PHP 57,000 in the Philippines.54 Commodore Dewey conferred an 
arrival honor to Aguinaldo upon his arrival in the Philippines and assured him that the 
United States recognizes the independence of the Philippines.55 The promised U.S. 
partnership and assurance of independence became a rallying point for the Filipinos in 
the intensified armed struggle against the Spaniards. However, the Americans not only 
planned for a military intervention in the Philippines; the imperialistic propensities of the 
Americans intensified their interest to colonize the Philippines.56  
Theodore Roosevelt, the acting secretary of the U.S. Navy, envisioned the 
expansion of American influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States lacked the 
colonial presence overseas, specifically in the Southeast Asian region. Roosevelt 
anticipated the Spanish-American war as an opportunity to seize Spanish colonies, 
particularly the Philippine Island. Motivated by the thoughts and imperialistic ambitions 
of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and reinforced by 
Commodore Dewey’s aggressive stance, Roosevelt planned the American takeover by 
attacking Manila.57 The imminence of war with Spain prompted the United States to 
prepare contingency plans for war with Spain’s forces in the Philippines. The United 
States Asiatic Fleet under Commodore Dewey to prepare for the planned offensive action 
against the Spanish Forces in the Philippines deployed in Hong Kong.  
On May 1, 1898, the Battle of Manila Bay between the American armada and the 
Spanish Fleet commenced.58 The antiquated Spanish fleet was easily defeated with 
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virtually no damage to the American fleet. Meanwhile, the Filipino insurgents had been 
victorious in their heightened land offensives that had become a nationwide general 
uprising against the Spaniards.59 The Spanish fleet defeat in Manila Bay and the Filipino 
revolutionary’s effective control of most major cities and towns diminished the Spanish 
domination of the Philippines. For the time being, officials in Washington sent a 5,000 
strong expeditionary force under General Wesley E Merritt on June 30, 1898, aimed to 
establish an effective control of Manila and in furtherance of the proposed colonization of 
the Philippines.60  
Spain’s major setback in the Battle of Manila Bay and Cuba, along with its losing 
the battle with the Filipino revolutionaries, prompted the Spanish to transfer the colonial 
government in the Philippines to the Americans.61 The United States and Spain agreed to 
a truce stipulating that the United States would retain Manila City and Manila Bay and 
that a separate peace treaty would decide the fate of the Philippine archipelago.62 In the 
name of honor and chivalry, through a Belgian consul, the Spaniards facilitated for a 
‘mock’ battle with the U.S. forces before their surrender.63 The staged surrender of 
Manila by the Spaniards put the Americans in full control of the city, which sidelined the 
Filipino armed endeavors.64 
On December 10, 1898, Spain and the U.S. delegates signed the Treaty of Paris, 
ceded the Philippines, and transferred the colonial power of Spain to the United States 
after paying $20,000,000, without the knowledge of the Filipinos’ leaders.65 The treaty 
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officially ended the Spanish-American War, but it would serve as a fuse for the bloody 
Philippine-American War.66 
B. THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR AND THE AMERICAN 
COLONIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES 
The U.S. action to colonize the Philippines brought enmity between the former 
partners igniting the Philippine-American War in 1899. On February 4, 1899, the war 
officially began when U.S. soldiers shot a Filipino soldier in Manila.67 The two forces 
fought conventionally, and shifted to guerrilla warfare in the final days of the war. The 
Filipinos waged conventional warfare in an effort to highlight its legitimacy, self-
governance, and world acceptance.68 The U.S. forces dominated the battlefield in the 
realm of conventional warfare pitting superior firepower, training and ample logistics 
against the superiority in numbers and ferocity of the Filipinos.69 The U.S. forces 
believed that the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo, the Filipino resistance leader, and the U.S. 
control of most strategic areas in the Philippines signified that the war had ended.70 
However, the decentralized Filipino forces waged a bloody and costly guerilla war that 
would obligate the United States to deploy 69,420 troops in 1900.71 The onset of the 
guerilla war marked the increased brutality against the Filipinos attributed to the U.S. 
battle tactics, re-concentration policy, and the use of indigenous scouts to suppress the 
Filipino resistance.72  
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The prominence of the U.S. forces’ brutality impelled President McKinley’s 
proclamation of the “benevolent assimilation.”73 In an effort to tone down the massive 
military subjugation of the Philippines, he stated that the primary aim of the United States 
was to “win the confidence, respect, and affection of the Filipinos by guaranteeing their 
rights and liberties,” and “by substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary 
rule.”74 However, the action was an attempt to appease the U.S. domestic audience and 
explain the propensity of American imperialism.75 Nonetheless, the strategy did not 
diminish the atrocities committed by the warring parties during the war. The war was 
brutal and bloody, and lasted for three years incurring over 4,200 American casualties, 
over 20,000 Filipino combatants, and as many as 250,000 Filipino civilians deaths caused 
by other forms of  violence, war-related diseases, and famine.76  
Remarkably, the end of the war on July 4, 1902, and the subsequent American 
colonization of the Philippines, introduced a new perspective to the Filipinos. The U.S. 
leadership application of the policy of attraction introduced self-governance, social 
reforms, and implementation of economic development to the Filipino people creating an 
environment of cooperation and independence. Interestingly, the U.S. Army played a 
vital role in the Philippines’ state building. It was the principal organization instrumental 
in the creation and development of public institutions.77 The U.S. Army actively involved 
itself in the counterinsurgency operations and the governance of the established civil 
authority and institutions.78 As such, the U.S. Army established the Philippine Scouts 
(PS) as the U.S. colonial army that served in the counterinsurgency operations.79 The PS 
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would serve as the indigenous Territorial Army during the Philippine Autonomy and the 
Commonwealth period. 
On August 29, 1916, the U.S. Congress enacted the Philippine Autonomy Act or 
the Jones Law of 1916 that declared the speedy granting of the Philippine Independence 
and the hastening the of the Filipino control of the Philippines.80 The U.S. Congress 
enactment of the Tydings-McDuffie Act on March 24, 1934, created the Philippine 
Commonwealth Government in a semi-autonomous rule for ten years in preparation for 
the independence.81 It brought forth the professionalization of the Filipino soldiers and 
the organization of the Philippine Army.82 In addition, the act officially authorized the 
deployment of U.S. personnel in the Philippines, the U.S. maintenance of sovereignty of 
its military Bases, and the right to represent the Philippines in foreign affairs.83  
C. THE WORLD WAR II CHALLENGE 
The rise of Japan in the early 1930s and 1940s, and its growing power and 
influence in global affairs, termed “Japanese Monroeism,” expanded its influence and 
territorial claim over Korea, Manchuria, and Vietnam.84 This event prompted President 
Franklin Roosevelt to create the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). 
General Douglas MacArthur, the head of the USAFFE, pushed for the strengthening of 
the Philippine Defense System and conceptualized the War Plan “Orange” as the external 
security plan.85 However, the defense preparation was plagued with complications 
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attributed to former military policies and political interventions. For example, the 1921 
Washington Naval Conference stipulated the prohibition of upgrading Philippine 
fortifications and modernization of its army.86 The founding of the League of Nations in 
World War I and the Washington Naval Conference created a false belief that the 
presence of peace institutions and mechanisms could ensure the status quo in the balance 
of power. These mechanisms were widely believed as deterrence for nations to commits 
acts of foreign aggression.87 The Philippine Resident Commissioners to the United 
States, Isauro Gabaldon and Pedro Guevarra, favored Woodrow Wilson’s principle of 
idealism believing that the League of the Nations promise of collective security would 
spare the Philippines from foreign invasion. Philippine Senator Pedro de la Llana 
dissented asserting his realpolitik’s stance that the Philippines would eventually tangle 
with the complexity of international affairs, because of the absence of permanent security 
for peace among nations.88 Furthermore, the non-release of the Philippines’ $50 Million 
gold devaluation and sugar tax fund by the U.S. government, affected the Philippines’ 
pursuit of defense capability upgrade and Philippine Army modernization.89  
On December 8, 1941, the Japanese Imperial Army invaded the Philippines and 
challenged the U.S.-Philippine defenses. In a matter of time, the Philippines capitulated 
to the might of the Japanese war machine and declared Manila as an open city. The 
surrender of the USAFFE in Bataan signaled the Japanese Imperial Army victory and 
control of the whole Philippine Archipelago. The Filipino Resistance fighters and the 
remnants of the USAFFE combined forces conducted guerilla warfare against the 
Japanese. The return of MacArthur conventional forces assisted by the guerillas led to the 
Japanese defeat and liberation of the Philippines on July 5, 1945.90 
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D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The military relationship between the Philippines and the Unites States during the 
Spanish-American War does not merit an alliance. Per Walt’s definition, an alliance 
should fall between a cooperation of two sovereign states, which were also supported by 
the definition of Bergsmann. However, this period manifested the characteristics of 
alliance formation in consonance with Walt’s balance of threat theory’s main points. 
Although the Philippines at this time were not a sovereign government, the Filipino 
revolutionary and the U.S. government mimicked alliance characteristics as described in 
Walt’s theory. First, the Filipino revolutionaries co-opted with the U.S. forces and tried to 
balance against the Spanish forces. Second, the partnership manifested an informal 
alignment of ideology as demonstrated in their shared belief of democracy as both 
parties’ advocated freedom and independence. Third, the two partners explored the 
exchange of resources to fight a common enemy. Last, the diplomats and the leaders 
exemplified Walt’s premise on penetration of or access to the political system. Overall, 
the two forces manifested the characteristics of the state’s desire of forming an alliance. 
The military cooperation during the American-Spanish War served as the foundation of 
the Philippine-U.S. military partnership. It challenged a common threat; however, the 
Philippines and the United States had unshared strategic interests. The Philippines 
regarded the military partnership with the United States as an opportunity to defeat the 
colonial power of Spain towards the achievement of the long-sought independence. 
Contrastingly, the U.S. intention was beyond defeating the Spanish forces in the 
Philippines. Its ultimate objective was to control the Philippines and revealed its 
propensity of imperialism towards the Asia-Pacific region.91 The U.S. victory over Spain 
and the control of the Philippines established its foothold in the region that ensured its 
ability to pursue economic and geopolitical interest. Controlling the Philippines provided 
the United States a geopolitical advantage in its power projection and commercial trade 
in Asia. Notwithstanding the odds and unshared goals, the symbiotic relationship 
between the United States and the Philippines worked out in defeating a common threat, 
though distrust and rift in the pursuit of their respective interests existed. Thus, the first 
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Philippine-U.S. military partnership was a product of the two nations’ exigency and 
motives of self-interests. 
Walt’s theory remains irrelevant in terms of his definition of the alliance during 
the Philippine-U.S. War and colonization period. Nonetheless, the Philippine-American 
War and the subsequent colonization of the Philippines primed the formation and 
management of a future alliance. The state-building policy of the United States in the 
Philippines was consistent with Walt’s points about the importance of ideology, 
penetration, and foreign aid in the development of a future ally. The colonization period 
enhanced the democratization of the Philippines wherein the United States managed to 
inculcate the seed of democracy and steered the alignment of the Filipino people with the 
American ideology. The United States’ military and politicians’ engagement in the 
Philippines’ state building slowly molded the Filipino society into the image of the 
Americans. The significant developments in this period enhanced the ideological 
alignment as well as the laying out of the foundation of a similar and accessible political 
system. The U.S. effort would prove fruitful in its future endeavor with the GPH. The 
U.S. inherent action to extend economic and military aid to its colony further develops 
the interdependence of both parties. All actions that the United States took during this 
period seem to point in the direction of creating a future ally that could assist and protect 
its interests. 
The Philippine-American War and the subsequent American colonization of the 
Philippines provided vast opportunities to the Filipinos and the United States to advance 
military thinking. The war between the former partners provided an opportunity to test 
their respective combat capacity and resolve. It created opportunities to develop and 
refine doctrines and strategies that could withstand the ever-changing aspect of the 
warfare. The war served as a political instrument for the Filipinos to achieve legitimacy 
and independence. Moreover, it facilitated the remodeling of the warfare methodology in 
response to the disparity of force to maximize accessible resources. Evidently, the war 
sided with the better equipped, as well as the well-trained and more disciplined army; it 
revealed the disparity of combat capability of the two contending forces that measured 
 25
their respective combat value. However, the war proved costly to both sides in terms of 
loss of lives and properties and the extent of expenditures.  
On the positive side, the U.S. introduction of the policy of benevolent assimilation 
won the hearts and minds of the Filipinos. It served as a foundation for the envisioned 
transformation of the Philippines into a nation-state. The United States molded the 
Philippines into its image invoking its ideals of freedom and democracy that helped foster 
their future relationship. In the military perspective, the U.S. military during this period 
epitomized its flexibility and significance as a pacifier, peacekeeper, and an essential 
element in nation building. Moreover, the U.S. ability to assimilate the indigenous forces 
as force multiplier benefited both parties. It transferred the U.S. Army’s burden to fight a 
local war that elevated the effective morality of the war. The Philippine Scouts acting as 
the U.S. colonial army showed the development of military camaraderie between the 
United States and the Filipinos that proved invaluable in the conduct of joint military 
efforts.92 
Finally, the American colonization in the Philippines advanced the U.S. national 
interest and its ultimate goal of achieving geopolitical interest in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The enactment of the Tydings-McDuffie Law ensured the continuous U.S. military 
presence in the Philippines that provided protection of its geopolitical and economic 
interests and maintained its foothold in the Asia-Pacific region. Similarly, the 
establishment of functioning U.S. civil and military institutions in the Philippines 
supported the U.S. government’s drive for maritime dominance, increased economic 
influence, and market expansion in Asia for its rapidly growing capitalist system. 
However, the rise of Japan as a global power would challenge the U.S. presence in Asia. 
In this pre-alliance period, the Philippines, as an understudy of the United States 
in governance, responded to balance with its mentor. The action aligns with Walt’s point 
that states facing a foreign aggression will align together to oppose the states posing the 
threat. Since Japan was a powerful aggressor that posed the greatest threat, and in close 
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geographical proximity, made the Philippines align against it, which is consistent with the 
balance of threat theory. Japan’s military might in the region exhibited a strong offensive 
capability which explains why the Philippines formed a defensive coalition with the 
United States. In addition, the U.S. establishment of shared ideology with the Philippines 
and its access to its political system contributed to the alignment. The substantial aid 
given by the United States to the Philippines before the outbreak of the war increased the 
likelihood of the alignment, the control of the United States in the Philippines and the 
manifestation of an alliance-like attitude between them. 
World War II tested the foundation of the Philippines-U.S. military partnership as 
the two nations jointly confronted the threat of foreign invasion. The war revealed the 
partnership’s strengths and vulnerabilities in confronting the threat. It uncovered the 
effect of the U.S. colonization and the Philippine Autonomy government’s avocation in 
the development of the Philippine defense. Their unaligned strategic perspectives 
restricted the Philippine defense modernization. The two nations’ opposing domestic and 
international concerns that included the maintenance of U.S. sovereignty over the 
Philippines, the upkeep of Philippine Commonwealth government’s stability, and the 
international relations repercussion of a military buildup significantly influenced the 
degrading of the partnership’s military capacity. A broad spectrum of political tensions 
between the United States and Philippine leaders affected the competence of the 
partnership to provide the necessary defense posture. The political rigidities 
overwhelmed the importance of forming a credible defense capability that could have 
elevated the partnership’s potency. Moreover, the U.S. apprehensiveness and lack of trust 
with its counterpart degraded the planned robust defense capability buildup that could 
have developed the Philippines as a competent security partner. Strengthening the 
Philippines in the military aspect could have guaranteed the United States a capable 
strategic ally able to confront threats and secure shared strategic interests. Evidently, 
politics was a major factor in the changing aspects of the Philippine-U.S. military 
relations. The U.S. policy during the colonization period and the two nations’ political 
power struggle shaped the Philippine military and the partnership’s status. 
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Nevertheless, the war nurtured the deepening relationship of the Philippines and 
the United States. They fought a joint war for a shared cause until the fall of Bataan, and, 
thereafter in the form of an insurgency that ran until the return of General MacArthur late 
in 1944. The two nations manifested unequivocal traits of fortitude and resilience in times 
of adversity. The war validated the significance of a future alliance, specifically the 
ability of the member-states to cooperate and execute joint strategy to challenge a foreign 
aggression. The success of the Philippine-U.S. partnership in World War II enabled them 
to overcome significant trials and prepare them from the future challenges of the 
dynamics of post-World War II atmosphere. These underlying circumstances promoted 
the U.S. and the Philippines’ action to forge a stronger alliance in preparation for the 
beginning of the Philippine Independence. 
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III. THE FORMALIZATION AND BREAKDOWN OF THE 
PHILIPPINE-UNITED STATES ALLIANCE  
If we review the relevance of Walt’s balance of threat theory in this chapter, it 
will show that it is applicable. During this period, the condition of the Philippine-U.S. 
relationship managed to achieve the conditions that Walt had set. This chapter narrates 
the forging of a formalized alliance between the Philippines and the United States. The 
role of threats and mechanisms are relevant in this chapter, because it shows how it 
influenced the dynamics of the Philippine-U.S. alliance by using Walt’s theory as a 
guide.  
A. THE PHILIPPINE-U.S. ALLIANCE DURING THE COLD WAR 
The end of World War II marked the onset of the Cold War. It forced the two 
emerging superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—into an international 
power struggle for ideological, geopolitical, and economic expansion. The superpowers 
vied to influence war-ravaged nations to impose their respective ideologies and interests. 
As a result, a clash of ideologies occurred between U.S. capitalism and the Soviet 
Union’s Communism in their quest for world domination.93 Thus, the Cold War era 
began. Cold War is a term that describes the political and military relationship between 
the United States and the Soviet Union from post-World War II to the late 1980s. In the 
Asia-Pacific, the Southeast Asian region became a pivotal frontline of the Cold War 
geopolitics. The communist spread in the region affected China, Korea, and Vietnam, and 
other states. As a response, the United States established numerous bilateral alliances in 
the Asia-Pacific region. Its primary aim was to curtail the growing influence of the Soviet 
Union and deter the spread of Communism among Asian nations.  
The Cold War period witnessed the birth of a new nation-state, the Philippines. 
On July 4, 1946, the United States granted the full independence of the Philippines.94 The 
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young Philippine Republic built in the image of its colonizer adopted the western 
principles of democracy, and it remained the Asian state with the closest ties to the 
United States.95 During the colonial period, the U.S. shaped the Philippines as a nation 
with shared principles and ideals that was keen to support U.S. foreign policy and 
interests.96 Furthermore, the U.S. established mechanism to legalize its presence and 
maintain an individual level of sovereignty and control over the Philippines after its 
independence. For instance, the Treaty of General Relations and Protocol signed by the 
U.S. and the Philippines on July 4, 1946 established the new bilateral relationship 
between them, in which the military bases would play a vital role.97 The treaty 
acknowledged the Philippine sovereignty and control of the whole archipelago excluding 
the U.S. military bases.98 In addition, it authorized the U.S. to represent the foreign 
affairs of the Philippine as requested by the latter.99 Thus, the treaty assured the U.S. a 
military foothold in the Philippines for its power projection, protection of interests, and 
containment policy in Southeast Asia. Similarly, on March 21, 1947, representatives from 
both nations signed the Philippine-U.S. Military Assistance Agreement (MAA) that 
enhances the development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) capability 
through U.S. assistance. It created the Joint United States Military Advisory Group 
(JUSMAG) to advise and train the AFP and paved the way for the authorized handover of 
military war equipment and logistics.100 For the Philippines, the treaty assured a U.S. 
security umbrella from external aggression. Furthermore, it provided vital military aid 
and economic benefits. Hence, the improved Philippine-U.S. alliance provided the war-
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ravaged Philippines an opportunity to focus on the alleviation of domestic social 
problem, focused counterinsurgency operations, and postwar reconstruction. In brief, 
both nations benefitted from these agreements, and strengthened the Philippine-U.S. 
alliance during the Cold War.  
The Cold War enhanced the primacy of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. The two 
nations’ common strategic interests, democratic ideals, and shared threats compelled 
them to formalize a bilateral security alliance. As a U.S. stronghold in Southeast Asia, the 
Philippines proved to be a crucial factor in the U.S. foreign policy of “containment” 
during the cold war. The containment was a U.S. policy projected for the Soviet Union 
during the post-World War II to suppress its influence in reshaping the post-war 
international order.101 The wide and rapid spread of the communist insurgency 
throughout Southeast Asia caused alarm among western democratic nations. The 
successful communist revolution in China in 1949 and the succeeding communist-
inspired South Korean War (1950–1953) and the Vietnam War (1965–1975) obliged the 
U.S. to reinforce its relationship with the Philippines for it served as a part of the U.S. 
strategic defense perimeter in the Pacific.102 In addition, the Cold War underscored a new 
kind of strategy–a proxy war between the two superpowers fought by their client states–
and the Philippines served as a U.S. surrogate state.103 The Philippine-U.S. bilateral 
alliance proved crucial in the U.S. containment policy in the Asia-Pacific region.  
The U.S. and the Republic of the Philippines’ commitment for enhanced security 
cooperation led to the conceptualization of the 1951 MDT and the creation of a military-
to-military engagement framework—the 1958 RP-U.S. Mutual defense Board (MDB). 
On August 30, 1951, Philippine and U.S. representatives signed the MDT in Washington, 
D.C., that formalized the Philippine-U.S. bilateral alliance.104 The treaty stipulated the 
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Philippines and U.S. mutual support in case of an external attack to their respective 
territories and troops.105 It outlined that the U.S. and the Philippines separately and 
jointly by their own initiative and mutual support maintained and developed their 
individual and collective capacity to thwart armed foreign state aggression.106 
Complementing the MDT, the MDB served as a mechanism to enhance the shared 
security defense obligation of both nations that oversees the planning and implementation 
of joint military activities. The MDB activities encompassed the development of 
Philippine external defenses to mitigate any foreign aggression. The institutionalization 
of the Philippine-U.S. alliance security mechanisms enhanced the two nations’ ability to 
confront the Cold War period’s internal and external security challenges. However, the 
MDT provision disconnected the Philippine and U.S. leaders in what they called 
“security-sovereignty dilemma.”107 The dilemma referred to the vague and informal 
assurance of the United States action that in case a foreign aggressor attack the 
Philippines, the U.S. would immediately come to its aid.108 Incorporated in the MDT in 
August 1951, article IV of the treaty stated “each party recognizes that an armed attack in 
the Pacific area, or either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety 
and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its 
constitutional process.”109 However, the Filipinos remain disgruntled with the article, and 
several attempts to resolve the dilemma occurred between July 1953 and August 1965. 
However, after four negotiations over a 12-year span, the Philippine sovereignty and 
security issue, defined in the MDT, remains vague.110 
At the height of the Cold War, an internal communist movement menaced the 
Philippines. The resurgence of the communist-inspired Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon 
(HUKBALAHAP) insurgency in 1946, originally against the Japanese Imperial Army, 
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challenged the stability of the Philippines.111 In 1949, the HUKBALAHAP changed its 
name to Hukbong Mapagpalaya Sa Bayan (HMB), but was still widely known as the 
HUK.112 The Huk Communist Insurgency measured the alliance ability to curtail an 
internal threat. In a short period, the insurgency ended through the combined approach of 
the Philippines and the United States forces.113 The combined Philippine-U.S. advisory 
groups designed workable counterinsurgency strategies (COIN) to suppress the HUK 
rebellion.114 American interventionism was one of the critical factors that contributed to 
the success of the counterinsurgency campaign against the Huk.115 The U.S. military aid 
to the AFP proved crucial to the execution of the COIN strategy.116 In a span of five-
years, the AFP defeated the Huk Communist Insurgency without the U.S. Armed Forces 
direct intervention.117 The non-involvement of the U.S. Armed forces in the COIN 
operations advanced the GPH’s legitimacy and highlighted the professionalism of its 
armed forces in handling internal threats. The defeat of the Huks exemplified the efficacy 
of the alliance execution of a joint approach without jeopardizing the sovereignty of the 
host nation. Thus, the action of the alliance averred the exploitation of sensitive issues 
that may undermine the alliance.  
The advent of the new communist insurgency in 1968 under the Communist Party 
of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) challenged the alliance in a peculiar 
manner. The globalization in the 1960s and its consequential effect served as a rallying 
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point for the new insurgency. The insurgents capitalized on the globalization cause and 
effect on social conditions that undermine the relevancy of existing geographic 
boundaries. In particular, the progressive left and the nationalists used the socio-political 
and economic issues to pursue their strategic goal of overthrowing the government. The 
CPP-NPA focused on the existence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines as a cause of 
socio-political problems. It extensively focused on the exploitation of the U.S. military 
presence and sovereignty issue. The CPP-NPA used its unified legal front and armed 
propaganda units in an intensified anti-American propaganda campaign to incite the 
masses. They propagate the U.S. presence as a symbol of continuing American 
oppression that tramples Philippine sovereignty. They expound that the ongoing 
insurgency is a continuation of the Philippines revolution during the American 
colonization.  
In addition, the dictatorial regime of President Ferdinand Marcos from 1965 to 
1986 instigated the rise of the insurgency. The Marcos martial law regime’s 
undemocratic ways and blatant human rights abuses committed by the Philippine military 
created a negative mantra. The martial law period formed socio-political issues favorable 
to the insurgents. However, Ferdinand E. Marcos believed otherwise. Marcos argued that 
the declaration of martial law seeks to curtail the brewing combined social, political, and 
internal security threats.118 Varied internal security threats challenged the GPH in this 
period that includes the CPP-NPA communist insurgency, Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) secessionist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracy and rampant 
criminality in the Philippines.119 In particular, the CPP-NPA instigated massive 
uprisings, and violent political crimes triggered the declaration of the martial law that 
promotes its revolutionary struggle.120 The communist insurgents executed stealthy 
violent actions targeting the political rivals of Marcos aimed to create a traumatic event 
that could turn the tide of the armed struggle as exemplified in the Plaza Miranda 
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bombing on August 21, 1971.121 Marcos argued that the application of the martial law 
was lawful with full approval of the legislative and judicial institution of the Philippines, 
but not by his wishes.122 Ninoy Aquino, Marcos’ political archrival, confirmed that the 
Philippines was a sick society in need of reforms that needed an authoritarian regime.123 
Marshall Green, the assistant secretary for East Asia, further defended Marcos’ 
implementation of martial law as an essential deed to address the deplorable breakdown 
of the integral social fabric of the Philippines.124 Nonetheless, the rampant abuses of the 
Philippine military favored the narrative of the CPP-NPA propaganda. The propaganda 
prevailed over the real intention of martial law. Surprisingly, the United States, the 
worldwide human rights advocate, sidelined the issue. They prioritized strategic interests 
over the alleged abuses of Marcos’ regime. Besides, the United States had its share of 
social and military abuses committed by American service members in the Philippines. 
Further, the overthrow of the Marcos regime would incur a loss of a staunch ally 
detrimental to the U.S. interest.  
Nevertheless, the Philippine-U.S. military alliance maintained its strong ties 
during the Marcos regime. The U.S. government continued its support to the GPH and its 
development effort of the Philippine armed forces. The GPH and its military reaped the 
benefits and compensation from the alliance-institutionalized structures. The military and 
security structures of the Alliance covered three agreements that include are the Mutual 
Defense Pact, Military Assistance Agreement, and Military Facilities Agreement.125 On 
January 6, 1979, the Philippines and the United States redefined the provision of the U.S. 
military bases by making a significant revision to the Military Bases Agreement of 
1947.126 The amendment reaffirmed Philippine sovereignty over the U.S. military bases 
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in the Philippines, reduced the aggregate area of the military reservations, and required a 
bi-decade review of the agreement. Marcos’ political maneuvering and aggressive 
negotiation on base compensation led to the increase of U.S. military and economic aid to 
the Philippines. It amounted to U.S. $400 million in the period of 1979 to 1983.127 
Adversely, the Philippines problem in internal security and the declaration of martial law 
steered the AFP as a primary internal force. The AFP focused extensively towards 
economic development, administration of martial rule, and internal security 
operations.128 Thus, the AFP became an internal security-centric force but external 
defense inept. 
In terms of external defense cooperation, the Philippine-U.S. Alliance worked 
together in various international military engagements. Filipino soldiers fought alongside 
the United States in battling the communist forces in the Korean War and Vietnam War. 
Moreover, the Philippines served as a valuable asset to the U.S. Pacific’s strategy of 
deterrence and naval offensive capability.129 In particular, the American bases in the 
Philippines were instrumental to the U.S. Cold War strategy in their quest for global 
stability and hegemony. The bases operated extensively as logistics hubs and staging 
points in support of U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East 
region.130 It increased the U.S. logistical power and flexible force projection that 
safeguards U.S. strategic interests.131 In Southeast Asia, the bases became a center for 
operation in America’s intervention activities in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and 
Taiwan. Reciprocally, the U.S. bases provided external defense to the Philippines that 
deterred foreign invasion. 
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B. THE PHILIPPINE-U.S. ALLIANCE BEYOND THE COLD WAR 
In Southeast Asia, the end of the Cold War created an opportunity for the nation-
states to realign alliances and foreign policies. This realignment and non-alignment were 
in response to the power related consequences with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.132 From the Philippine perspective, the post-Cold War would substantiate a new 
era of regional conflicts and the resurgence of ancient ethnic and religious enmities.133 
The realignment of foreign policies and adoption of respective programs of national 
development would create a political space for traditional movements to arise.134 The re-
emergence of regional and traditional threats coupled with the socio-political and 
economic implications of the post-Cold War drove nations to evaluate their alignment 
with emerging powers. The dynamics of the post-Cold War era swayed the future of 
military alliances. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War. It resulted in 
the U.S. reassessment of its global strategy. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States 
shifted its policy to the reduction of forward-deployed forces and establishment of 
numerous bilateral and multilateral defense treaties. One critical aspect of the policy 
change is the U.S. budgetary constraint. The U.S. defense budget played a vital role in the 
development of its post-Cold War policy. The post-Cold War showed the United States 
suffering from internal constraints due to enormous domestic budgetary and trade 
deficits. The budget restrained the United States from executing direct military 
intervention unless there are clear dangers to essential American investments.135 Its 
defense spending during the Cold War period proved costly and bloated the U.S. defense 
budget.136 In addition, the United States shifted its forces towards the Middle East, 
Eastern Europe, and Latin America to address varying security concerns. Hence, the 
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reduction of U.S. military assets and personnel created a security vacuum in the Asia-
Pacific region. It created an opportunity for China, a growing regional power, to expand 
unchallenged and in so doing, tilted the balance of power. Most importantly, it would 
affect the contemporary status of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. 
The end of the Cold War roused the awareness for Filipino self-identity. It 
heralded the rise of Filipino nationalism. It magnified the Filipino nationalist’s quest for 
sovereignty and increased nationwide anti-American and anti-nuclear sentiments. The 
radicalized students and the communist insurgents collaborated with the so-called “civil-
societies” in the struggle to end the U.S. presence. The 1986 EDSA revolution that ousted 
the Marcos regime intensified Filipino nationalism and the call for the U.S. bases 
removal. The Filipinos’ intense anti-U.S. sentiments emanated from the U.S. support of 
the Marcos dictatorship, U.S. service members human rights abuses, and the U.S. bases 
consequential social issues. In addition, the partiality of the media as a propaganda tool of 
the progressive groups influenced the Filipino people’s opinion. It served as a medium in 
the aggravated call for the immediate ejection of the U.S. bases.  
In addition, Filipino politicians’ prevailing view on security matters steered the 
course of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. The fall of the Soviet Union created an atmosphere 
of peace that put the alliance in question. The mandate of the alliance as a foreign 
aggression deterrence diminished. The absence of credible external threats in the 
Philippines made the U.S. security umbrella irrelevant. The post-Cold War condition 
further aggravated the activism of the Filipino politicians and elites during the Cold War. 
It strengthened their outlook that the alliance was economically beneficial with little 
security significance. These beliefs threatened the importance of the alliance. It would 
continue to contribute to the non-allocation of necessary defense budget for the AFP 
external defense capability upgrade. Consequently, the various conditions in the post-cold 
war and the contradictory perspective of the Philippines and the U.S. political leaders led 
to the weakening of the alliance in the early 1990. According to Barton Brown’s 
description in The Philippine-United States Bases Debate (1993), the rift between the 
United States and the Philippines regarding the U.S. bases issue was “wedded to 
divergent conceptions of reciprocity, neither side understands the other’s appeals for fair 
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and just exchange.”137 The politicians of both countries were inconsistent concerning the 
requisites and nuances of the military bases agreement.  
The rise of Filipino nationalism, the political squabbles, and the communist 
insurgents’ intensified anti-U.S. propaganda weakened the stability of the alliance. The 
Filipino traditional politicians took advantage the post-Cold War effect and the 
globalization to empower themselves and dictate the direction of the alliance. On the 
other hand, the communist insurgents used the socio-political, cultural, environmental, 
and economic interconnections to their advantage in pursuance of their strategic 
objectives that created widespread GPH concerns. They used prominent issues such as 
the disparity of wealth among the rich and poor Filipinos and the infringement of the 
Philippine sovereignty and independence attributed to the U.S. military presence. The 
combined actions of the politicians and the insurgents posed as a clear and present threat 
on the stability of the alliance. The growing unpopularity of U.S. military presence in the 
Philippines and its numerous domestic abuses fueled the Philippine Congress to terminate 
the 1947 RP-U.S. Military Bases Agreement.  
On September 16, 1991, the alliance suffered a setback when the Philippine 
Senate abolished the 1947 Philippine-U.S. Military Bases Agreement ending the 94 years 
of U.S. military presence in the Philippines.138 The rejection of the Treaty of 
Cooperation, Friendship, and Security relinquished the American control of the bases in 
Clark Air Base on November 26, 1991, and the Subic Naval Base in December 1991 and 
triggered the dramatic withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Philippines. The U.S. response 
of downgrading its political and military relationship with the Philippines further 
degraded the alliance into an informal partnership. Its withdrawal of military assistance 
and its assignment of external security responsibility to the Philippines significantly 
affected the Philippine defense capability.  
The end of the U.S. military aid and economic benefits from the bases 
compensation degraded the AFP. The AFP’s deplorable state eroded the Philippines 
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credibility as a nation-state incapable of asserting its territorial integrity, defending its 
exclusive economic zone and in containing internal security threats.139 Furthermore, the 
bureaucratic gridlock of the local legislative bodies, the strained relationship with the 
United States, and the 1997 Asian currency crisis worsened the Philippines’ dilemma that 
affected the AFP modernization.140 The weakening of the alliance affected the AFP. In 
his article, “Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era,” Renato De Castro argued that the 
post-Cold War left the AFP as “one of the most ill-equipped and poorly funded armed 
forces in the Southeast Asian region after the Cold War.”141 
C. REVITALIZING THE PHILIPPINE-U.S. ALLIANCE 
The aftermath of the 1992 U.S. military bases closure in the Philippines put the 
alliance at its lowest point. In his article, “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security 
relations,” De Castro pointed out that the Philippines and the United States “lacked a 
consensus on the alliance’s raison d’être.”142 The consequential U.S. action of 
downgrading the Philippines as an insignificant ally on its Southeast Asian policy 
diminished the strategic importance of the Philippine-U.S. alliance.143 Notwithstanding 
the tremors caused by the eventual waning of the Philippine-U.S. military alliance, both 
nations maintained the MDT of 1951 and the 1958 MDB. These bilateral security 
arrangements served as the basis for the continuing military partnership of the two 
nations during its adverse time. It served as a reassurance to the continuing strategic 
security cooperation and commitment of both nations. It showed the significance of 
maintaining their security relationship for future strategic endeavor. The Philippines’ 
move to uphold the alliance mechanisms implied its reluctance to discard a longtime ally 
who shares mutual interest and ideals. Correspondingly, the U.S. adherence to these 
agreements indicates its continuous interest of keeping an amorous ally with significant 
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geopolitical potential in the Southeast Asian Region. In the pursuit of shared interests, the 
United States and the Philippines settled for a reduced alliance with a potential to 
rebound in times of need.  
Three years after the U.S. bases pullout from the Philippines in 1992, a new threat 
emerged that challenged the territorial integrity and external defense capability of the 
Republic of the Philippines. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) rise as a global 
power used its military might to flex its muscles in its foreign policy projection. Its 
assertive stance in the Southeast Asia involved the encroachment of the disputed islands 
claimed by Southeast Asian nations that include the Philippines. In January 1995, the 
PRC deployed naval vessels and built structures at the Mischief Reef located 150 miles 
from the Philippine coast.144 The reef’s proximity to the western frontier of the 
Philippines triggered the hysteria for the AFP Modernization and the idea of revitalizing 
its alliance with the United States.145  
The incident exposed the Philippines’ weak external defense posture. The GPH 
came to realize that it would take decades to establish a credible force to protect its 
territory. Its puny external security forces could not deter China’s growing expansionism 
in the South China Sea.146 The GPH conceded that a full Armed Forces modernization 
would not stand with China’s military might. However, military confrontations between 
the Philippine and Chinese forces were inevitable. A 90-minute naval gun battle erupted 
between the maritime forces of the Philippines and China in January 1996.147 In addition, 
the Philippine Navy engaged in the destruction of markers in the disputed islands and  
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reefs.148 However, China’s persistent multi-pronged approach in seizing disputed reefs 
prevailed. China’s gunboat policy aided in its expansionist goal of capturing disputed 
reefs and atolls in the South China Sea.149 These events sparked the Philippines interest 
in reestablishing its alliance with the United States.  
China’s growing assertiveness and military adventurism impelled the United 
States to reestablish its alliance with the Philippines in order to protect U.S. maritime and 
strategic interest in the region.150 China’s boldness to expand beyond the Asia-Pacific 
region became imminent, as its reprehensible actions remain unrestrained. China’s 
gunboat policy undermines established international maritime laws and promotes 
conflict. Its naval forces have dominated important sea-lanes of communication and have 
challenged traversing maritime traffic. In connection with this, the U.S. demanded the 
GPH to establish legal frameworks using the MDT to cover U.S. troops in the Philippines 
engaged in joint military-to-military activities with its counterparts. This request paved 
the way for the development of a permanent status of forces agreement (SOFA) for 
temporary deployed U.S. troops in the Philippines. 
On February 10, 1998, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon Jr. 
and U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard signed the Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces 
Agreement (VFA), the status of forces agreement.151 In order for the VFA to become 
executory, the Philippine Senate ratified the agreement on May 27, 1999, through Senate 
Resolution No. 18.152 The VFA is an executory agreement to the Philippine-U.S. MDT of 
1951 that ushered for the recommencement of combined military activities between the 
Philippines and the United States intended for interoperability and military forces 
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development.153 It serves as the legal framework that guarantees the lawful foothold of 
the U.S. military personnel in the Philippines and justifies U.S. military presence. It also 
permits the U.S. military troops to train, assist, and advise Philippine military troops to 
enhance interoperability and overall aggregate military capacity. However, it also 
stipulates that the prohibition of U.S. armed forces to engage in combat operations and 
the establishment of permanent forward operating bases in the Philippines. The signing of 
the VFA revitalized the decade-long hiatus of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. It manifested 
the mutual strategic security interdependence of the two nations. The Philippines needs 
the United States in its external security requirement, and the United States needs the 
Philippines as a geopolitical ally in support of its Asia-Pacific security interests. The 
VFA facilitated the restoration of the alliance, but the advent of international terrorism 
served as a catalyst in the revitalization of the Philippine-U.S. bilateral security 
cooperation. 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York, at the Pentagon, and in 
the airplane crash in Pennsylvania crash influenced a new security perspective of 
terrorism. Nations have become vulnerable to the threat of transnational non-state actors 
advocating violent terrorism. The call to the GWOT by U.S. President George Bush 
echoed worldwide that the GPH accepted. GWOT is a controversial term that 
encompasses all United States military strategy in combating AQ related, international, 
terrorist organizations. The presence of the AQ-linked Jemaah Islamiyah, and Abu 
Sayyaf Group in Southern Philippines established the opportunity for the United States to 
open up a GWOT front in Southeast Asia. President Gloria Arroyo and President Bush 
settled for the placement of U.S. Special Operation forces personnel in the Philippines. 
Their primary goal was to train and advise members of the Philippine Armed Forces in 
the rudiments of counterterrorism aimed to neutralize transnational and domestic Islamic 
radicals and AQ-linked terrorist groups in Southern Philippines. The AFP and the U.S. 
armed forces resumed dormant joint military exercises, such as the “Balikatan” 
(Shoulder-to-Shoulder) exercises. Most of the joint training exercises focused on 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency warfare, intelligence exchange training, civic-
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military operations, and logistics training. Similarly, on November 21, 2002, the 
Philippines and the United States signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement 
(MLSA). The MLSA is a framework of engagement that outlines the approach on mutual 
exchange of logistics support, supplies, and services throughout the duration of 
sanctioned military events. It supports most of the MDB-SEB programmed activities. In 
addition, the MLSA facilitated the AFP’s access to the U.S. military excess defense 
articles (EDA), an avenue to procure warfighting ground equipment, air and naval assets, 
and other military needs. 
In January 2002, the Joint Special Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) composed 
of combined U.S. armed services specialists deployed on a rotation basis in Southern 
Philippines. As part of the Operation Enduring Freedom, the JSOTF-P mandate was “to 
support the comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in their fight 
against terrorism.”154 Armed Forces of the Philippines units involved in counterterrorism 
efforts trained with the JSOTF-P that enhanced their antiterrorism skills. A joint effort 
between the United States and the Philippine forces resulted to a decrease in strength and 
presence of local terrorist group. However, the presence of the U.S. combat forces in the 
Philippines deemed unconstitutional. Philippine authorities declared that the provisions of 
the MDT and MDB do not cover non-traditional threats. Terrorism is a non-traditional 
threat because of its character as transnational non-state actors. The inapplicability of the 
MDT and MDB in the crusade against terrorism urged the GPH and the USG to establish 
a new framework. Initially, the United States and the Philippines negotiated special rules 
of engagements to circumnavigate the Philippine constitutional provisions of banning 
foreign troops to operate in the country. The political sensitivity of the sovereignty issue 
led to the creation of the Philippine-U.S. Security Engagement Board (SEB). The 
Romulo-Kenney Exchange of Notes on April 12, 2006, ushered the formal establishment 
of the SEB anchored with the Philippine-U.S. VFA.155  
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Similar to the MDB, the SEB as a legal and policy mechanism provides the GPH 
and the USG direct avenue to mutually approach non-traditional security issues in a 
direct and cyclical consultative way.156 The SEB aims to develop measures and 
arrangements for enhancing cooperation in addressing non-traditional security concerns 
as agreed by both parties.157 The non-traditional security concerns comprise terrorism, 
transnational crimes, maritime security and safety, and natural and man-made 
disasters.158 The SEB as a new legal framework address the concerns on the deployment 
of the U.S. Forces in Mindanao in the guise of conducting support in the war against 
terrorism. It allows the rotational deployment of U.S. troops and the transit of U.S. 
military assets in the Philippines. The Philippines’ participation in the Operations 
Enduring Freedom ascertained the importance of the country as a strategic ally of the 
United States in its war against terror. Its armed forces, as the primary recipient of the 
corresponding benefits, led to the improvement of its counterterrorism and humanitarian 
assistance function. For more than a decade, the U.S. military effectively supported the 
ability of the Philippine military to wage war in combatting terrorism that led to the 
decline of the local terrorist’s capacity to wage violence.  
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
If we are to review the events during the Cold War era using Walt’s balance of 
threat theory, it predicts the formation and strengthening of the Philippine-U.S. alliance 
in consonance with the theory’s main points. Though the Philippines was not directly 
threatened by the Soviet Union, it aligned with the United States because of the 
ideological factor and penetration. The Cold War exposed the expanding U.S. 
involvement in the Asia-Pacific, specifically in the East Asian region. The United States 
and the Philippines shared principles and ideals led to the alignment and establishment of 
the Philippine-U.S. alliance. The formalization of the Philippine-U.S. alliance supported 
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the policy of containment of the United States. In addition, it promoted the protection of 
the two nations’ shared interests. The Philippines and the United States, as separate 
sovereign nations, shared the common values of freedom and democracy. Despite the 
intricacies developed during the colonial period, the United States and the Philippines 
sustained their interdependent relationship. The direction that the American colonization 
took in the Philippines in the political, economic, cultural, and military aspect 
significantly influenced the Philippines’ perspective on the significance of the Philippine-
U.S. alliance. The Philippine-U.S. alliance exemplified the benefit of sharing resources 
and responsibility in pursuit of a common goal. It emphasized the importance of co-
optation and the precise role of the members in facing threats with socio-political 
influence as exemplified in the Huk counterinsurgency operations.  
The other factors that led to the Philippine-U.S. alliance conform to the theory’s 
penetration and bribery principles. The U.S. and the Philippine politicians and the elites 
influenced the cultural and political ethos of the alliance. The U.S. colonization and post-
colonization shaped the contemporary socio-political and cultural system of the 
Philippines. The self-serving Filipino elites and traditional politicians controlled the 
political and economic systems, and they remain uncommitted to the alleviation of 
decaying social conditions. They remained insensitive towards the average Filipino’s 
tangible economic and political demands; what concerned them was how to become more 
powerful and affluent. Most Filipino elites and politicians succumbed to the U.S. pressure 
of establishing and maintaining control of the Philippines. 
The United States would use its bases as an instrument of control for the 
Philippines. The U.S. bases in the Philippines revealed the drawn-out U.S. foreign policy 
that includes the establishment and maintenance of social control since the colonial 
period.159 It highlighted the American interventionism in Philippine affairs. Furthermore, 
the U.S. bases would exemplify the conflict and collaboration of the Filipino elites with 
the U.S. politicians. The U.S. military bases in the Philippines served the vested self-
interests of fallible Filipino politicians and the elites. They focused more on the 
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economics benefits rather than the security impact of the Philippine-U.S. alliance that 
would affect the future direction of the alliance and the development of the Philippine 
armed forces. 
The Philippine-U.S. alliance created a false sense of security in the Philippines. 
The Philippines delegated its inherent responsibility of external protection to the United 
States. The security umbrella provided by the United States diminished the Philippine 
leaders’ interest to develop its armed forces. It contributed to the superficial development 
of the Philippine armed forces territorial capacity. In the same way, the Philippines’ focus 
on internal security operations deflected its external defense capability upgrade. During 
the Cold War, most ASEAN countries were engaged in an arms race that led to the 
extensive development of their external security structures. On the other hand, the 
Philippines did not participate in the arms race for it relied on the U.S. forces’ external 
might in securing its territory. At the end of the Cold War, the Philippines would suffer 
the consequences of the pathetic development of its external defense structure. It would 
leave the Philippines external defense capability inferior to that of its ASEAN neighbors. 
Fortunately, the Philippine-U.S. alliance withstood the security challenges of the Cold 
War. Its survival could be attributed to the absence of a U.S.-Soviet Union’s armed 
conflict that could have affected the Philippines. Nonetheless, the Cold War substantiates 
the importance of an alliance between a superpower and a weak state. Yet, it also 
exposed a gap in the alliance. First, the United States needs to improve the Philippine 
security position in order to harness its full potential as a military ally in the Southeast 
Asian region in which Walt argues that states in alliance aggregate their ability to deter 
an opposing force. Second, the MDT disconnects the United States and the Philippines 
because of the “security-sovereignty issue” where a clear-cut automatic response by the 
United States is vague in the case where the Philippines were attacked externally. 
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos reiterated the problem during an undated speech 
in a press conference where he stated that the U.S. response is not immediate due to 
vagueness in the article of MDT.160 He stated that the provision of Mutual Defense Pact 
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causes delay in U.S. response due to the stated constitutional processes before its forces 
can react. On the role of threat to the dynamics of the alliance in this period, the 
existential threat provided a reason for the two nations to formalize the alliance and 
establish necessary mechanisms. The alliance used these mechanisms in the successful 
defeat of the HUK rebellion and in support of the security need of the United States 
during the Vietnam War and containment policy against the Soviet Union. 
The post-Cold War effect and rapid globalization left the Philippine-U.S. alliance 
at its nadir. As predicted by Walt, an alliance dissolves when the threatening party is 
defeated. The end of the Cold War did not end the Philippine-U.S. alliance, but it became 
insignificant. In addition, the principle of ideology and penetration manifested an 
opposite outcome. They did not help in the maintenance of the effectiveness of the 
alliance. Instead, they became a factor for the weakening of the alliance. The end of the 
Cold War invoked social and political adjustment for the Philippines and United States. It 
affected the two nations’ policies and their respective outlook in international affairs. In 
addition, globalization became a tool of concerned parties in advancing their self-
interests. These factors specifically the rooted consequence of the globalization 
influenced the state of the alliance. It created sufficient conditions that eventually led to 
the waning of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. Nonetheless, the Philippines and the United 
States maintained the legal frameworks, the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and the PH-
U.S. Mutual Defense Board, which bonded their ties. The treaty and the mechanism acted 
as a conduit in the continuous functioning of the alliance during its rock bottom state. In 
due course, these frameworks and mechanisms would serve as a springboard in the 
revitalization of the PH-U.S. alliance in response to China’s military expansionism and 
the advent of global terrorism.  
The central arguments of Walt’s balance of threat theory are clearly 
distinguishable during the revitalization period of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. As 
discussed previously, the Philippines and the United States revitalized their alliance due 
to the presence of China that poses a threat to the interests of both nations. In particular, 
the Philippines balanced with the United States to counteract the threat of China as 
predicted by Walt based on the source of threat principle. In addition, the shared 
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ideology, the reciprocal penetration of the member-states’ systems and the U.S. foreign 
aid to the Philippines led to the strengthening of the alliance. Hence, the existence of 
threats served as the impetus in the renewal of the Philippine-U.S. Alliance.  
The Philippines and the United States rekindled their interests in increasing their 
security cooperation in response to the advent of traditional and non-traditional threats. 
The threat of international terrorism and China’s expansionism constituted as a security 
challenge to both nations. The rise of militarized China tilted the balance of power in the 
Asia-Pacific region, and the advent of international terrorism undermines the security 
stability of both nations. Once again, their shared security concerns and strategic interests 
functioned as stimuli to the revitalization of the Philippine-U.S. alliance and the creation 
of new mechanisms. The signing of the VFA and the Philippine-U.S. MDB-SEB further 
enhanced the primacy of the alliance. The institutionalization of security agreements 
served as a concrete mechanism in addressing constitutional restrictions that impeded the 
efficacy of the alliance. The emplaced mechanisms not only addressed traditional threats 
of foreign aggression, but it also catered to non-traditional threats of terrorism and 
transnational crimes. Most importantly, the alliance moved into the disaster and human 
assistance realm that promoted its legitimacy. These undertakings transformed the 
alliance ability to respond in any unforeseen occurrences. In addition, the establishment 
of the MLSA supports the efficient execution of the alliance mandate of challenging 
traditional and non-traditional threats. Thus, the establishment and institutionalization of 
various Philippine-U.S. framework of engagement enhances the alliance responsiveness 
as an interoperable force ready to face future challenges. From 2002 to 2008, 
counterterrorism activities and human assistance disaster response helped to sustain the 
low-level bilateral security alliance of the Philippines and the United States. 
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IV. THE PHILIPPINE-U.S. ALLIANCE: CONTEMPORARY 
OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGES 
This chapter focuses on the security challenges and opportunities of the 
Philippine-U.S. alliance. The threats presented comprise shared and unshared threat in the 
alliance threat assessment. The China threat is applicable to the balancing and 
bandwagoning principles of Walt’s theory. However, though the CNN and the terrorism 
problem are domestic and classified as internal security problems, they affect the 
dynamics of the alliance. Using Walt’s theory as a guide, this chapter analyzes the effect 
of threat in the dynamics of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. The purpose of which is to 
highlight the influence of traditional and non-traditional threat in the alliance. 
Furthermore, at the end of the chapter, a discussion on the U.S. Asia-Pacific pivot 
highlights the interplay of threats and alliance mechanisms. 
A. SECURITY CHALLENGES 
The Philippine-U.S. alliance is presently confronted by a mixture of internal and 
external threats. The security challenges presented are the main factors that influence the 
contemporary status of the alliance. 
1. The Philippine Front in the Global War on Terrorism 
The non-traditional threat of international terrorism served as one of the factors in 
the Philippine-U.S. alliance revitalization and the designation of the Philippines as a 
major non-NATO ally.161 The lethality of the well-orchestrated September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attack in the United States started a global campaign to fight terrorism.162 The 
GPH’s acceptance of the cooperative engagement against transnational terrorists opened 
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up the second front of the GWOT in Southern Philippines.163 The presence of the AQ-
linked transnational terrorist groups of the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and 
Philippine’s ASG in Mindanao plagued the Philippines and its neighboring countries. 
Fighting for the establishment of regional Islamic caliphate, the JI collaborated with the 
ASG to create a regional terrorist network. The ASG espouses Sharia law and religious 
agenda to execute extreme violent activities in coercing the establishment of an Islamic 
state in Mindanao.164 The ruthlessness and dramatic activities of the ASG and being a 
part of an international terrorist network prompted the GPH and the U.S. to concentrate in 
eliminating them.  
The GPH support for the GWOT led to the renewal of the alliance and the 
prioritization of the Philippines as a recipient of the U.S. Security Force Assistance 
specifically on Foreign Internal Defense (SFA-FID).165 Unique to other GWOT fronts, 
the U.S. Forces merely provides advice and assistance to the AFP to enhance its capacity 
in executing counterterrorism efforts. The Philippines Constitution prohibits foreign 
forces to engage in direct combat operations in the Philippines. Thus, a large part of the 
U.S. operations concentrates on joint development projects and humanitarian assistance 
spearheaded by Armed Forces of the Philippines. The non-kinetic strategy intends to 
alleviate socio-economic issues in the targeted area that will empower the local populace 
to stand against terrorism. For decades, the focused joint civic-military actions and 
military exercises of the alliance aimed at the AQ-linked terrorist groups diminished the 
potency of the Islamist terrorism in Southern Philippines.166 Strikingly, the U.S.G. 
restricted its military from aiding the GPH in quelling the Philippine’s Communist 
Insurgency.167  
                                                 
163 Diane K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job, “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia : Limited Re-Engagement After 
Years of Benign Neglect,” Asian Survey : A Monthly Review of Contemporary Asian Studies Asian Survey 
Vol.47, no. 4 (July–August 2007): 635.  
164 Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, 
and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 4 (July 2001): 241–269,  
165 Michael J. Carden, Trainers, Advisors Help Philippines Fight Terrorism (Lanham, United States: 
Federal Information & News Dispatch, 2010). 
166 Lum and Niksch, The Republic of the Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations, 14. 
167 Carden, Trainers, Advisors Help Philippines Fight Terrorism, n/d. 
 53
The GWOT and its front in the Philippines continue on. The present weakened 
state of the ASG and its regression, as a bandit group, does not signal decisive victory for 
the Philippines and the alliance. The ASG will continue to tarnish the Philippine image, 
and it will continue to challenge the alliance by resorting to banditry. Its persistence will 
remain unabated. The high paying kidnap for ransom activities continues to nurture the 
ASG. In addition, the religious fanaticism of the ASG to pursue its Islamist agenda can 
again transform into its former stature as an able and justified terrorist group in waging 
military, political, and ideological war. The ASG can bounce back to its former self as it 
aligns with the emerging influential terrorist organization like the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS). The alignment may not be in the form of physical alliance with the 
network but on influencing its aim and ideology. 
Recently, the ASG and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) pledged 
their allegiance to the ISIS.168 The popularity of the ISIS and its aim to establish a global 
Islamic Caliphate garnered support from Islamic religious leaders and followers in 
Southern Philippines.169 The exposure of the Khilafah Islamiyah Movement (KIM), 
better known as the Khilafah Islamiyah Mindanao-Black Flag Movement, a secretive 
group that existed a few years back, organized and led the pledge of allegiance.170 The 
religious war in the Middle East initiated by the ISIS has attracted many foreign fighters 
from the ASEAN region. Unconfirmed number of radical Islamic terrorists belonging to 
the JI ASG, and BIFF reportedly joined as foreign Jihadists in the Middle East.171 BIFF, 
led by Umbra Kato, is the armed component of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom 
Movement (BIFM). The ISIS can radicalize the BIFM and ASG, which can transform 
them into a combined, well-coordinated, and more sophisticated terrorist group. Joining a 
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foreign Jihad has become a trademark and sixth pillar of Islam for these terrorist groups. 
Most of the founders, charismatic leaders and core members of these Islamic terrorist 
groups in the Philippines are veteran foreign Jihadists who fought with the Taliban during 
the invasion of Afghanistan by the Russian forces. 
Historically, the Southeast Asian-based Islamic terrorist groups collaborated in 
operational, training, and financial aspects in their quest for the establishment of the 
regional and worldwide Islamic Caliphate. The resemblance of the past and current 
events would likely increase the probability of the resurgence of terrorism in the 
Philippines. Moreover, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a known supporter of 
the ASG and JI, serves as strategy-changer in Mindanao. Presently, the MILF condemns 
the ISIS barbarity and savagery and pledges not to support terrorism.172 The ongoing 
peace treaty between the GPH and the MILF influenced the latter’s action of denying its 
support to the BIFF, ASG, and ISIS violent actions and goal of establishing an Islamic 
Caliphate. As of now, the GPH and the MILF are in the process of enacting the 
Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). Its purpose, as drafted by the Office of the Presidential 
Adviser on the Peace process (OPAPP), states that  
The BBL aims to establish a political entity, provide its basic structure of 
government, in recognition of the justness and legitimacy of the cause of 
the Bangsamoro people and their aspiration to chart their political future 
through a democratic process that will secure their identity and posterity 
and allow for meaningful self-governance.173  
The BBL is a part of the peace process brokered by the GPH and the MILF to end 
the hostilities in Mindanao. However, the BBL can serve as a fuse if its enactment fails. It 
may reignite the MILF secessionism that could lead to a costly and bloody war between 
the MILF and the AFP. It may trigger the renewal of an alliance between the MILF and 
the terrorist groups. Having curtailed the terrorists in Southern Mindanao, in 2011, the 
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alliance swayed its strategic focus from the GWOT towards the potential security threats 
in the South China Sea.174 
2. The China Threat and the SCS Dispute 
Shifting from Marxist economic policies to capitalism in the 1980s, China has 
developed into one of the world’s strongest economies being the second largest. China’s 
phenomenal economic growth contributed to the fast development of its modern and 
powerful armed forces. China has invested heavily on its military force towards their 
projected flex of muscle and assertion of sovereignty.175 In the realm of security, China 
exemplifies a rising military power that could influence global security. Its deliberate 
transformation from a regional to global power is evident on its effort to professionalize 
and revolutionize its military. However, China’s shortcomings in manifesting the 
characteristics of a traditional great power would categorize it as a partial global 
power.176 It does not meet the capabilities of a traditional power as revealed on its limited 
global power projection, non-establishment of alliances, and non-involvement in direct or 
indirect wars using proxy powers.177  
Nonetheless, China’s desire to modernize its military power was evident in its 
2012 aggregate military expenditures, the second biggest in the world, amounting to $106 
billion.178 Its consistent high annual defense spending for the past several years aimed to 
fill the gap on its military capability shortcomings. For this reason, China has become a 
significant but passive global security player. Within its turf, China’s domineering 
attitude and coercive military actions persecute its neighboring states. In the Southeast 
Asian region, China’s maritime dominance and assertive expansion remain uncontested. 
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Thus, China remains to be the most powerful Asian regional military power that affects 
the balance of power in the entire Asia-Pacific region.179 
China’s calculated military modernization and strategic posturing in the region are 
attributed to its historical blunders and global military power activities. First, China’s 
inability to undertake a modest cross-border incursion, due to geographical, logistical, 
and command impediments, led to its debacle incurring 42,000 casualties in a month’s 
time during its attack on Vietnam in 1979. Second, the U.S. military action and victory 
during the 1991 Gulf War created an impression of China’s military weakness. China 
recognized the necessity to revolutionize it military affairs to compensate its limitation in 
terms of firepower, battlefield mobility, intelligence, and technology.180 Third, the 1995 
and 1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis served as another catalyst in on China’s modernization 
and strategic thinking. China fired short-range ballistic missiles near Taiwan’s sea, aimed 
at coercing the outcome of the presidential election and threatens Taiwan’s independence 
movement. The event triggered the U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups’ deployment near 
the area of conflict. China realized the futility of single-dimensional strike capacity to 
coerce Taiwan and deny the intervention of the U.S. military during the crisis. This 
incident made China acknowledge the importance of a full spectrum attack capability to 
pursue the Taiwan conflict.181 The full spectrum attack capability includes the use of 
combined air, sea, ground, and electronic assets. Fourth, the multinational coalition’s 
forces application of military airpower through the use of stealth technology and 
precision guided munitions power in the conduct of war in the global conflict areas 
further influenced China’s desire to modernize technologically.182 Finally, China valued 
the United States and the multinational force’s ability to deploy numerous ground forces 
at great distances in pursuance of their strategic objectives.183 These stimuli drive China 
to pursue an overarching strategy and potent military capability upgrade that can address 
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its shortcoming as a rising power. Its military modernization and shift of strategic 
postures aim to develop its comprehensive power and prepare for the eventuality of a 
Taiwan conflict.184 China’s military dominance in the region and strengthened strategic 
posture, specifically in the South China Sea, provides a significant challenge to the 
Philippine-U.S. alliance. 
The global commons and dominant states’ rise and decline in power control affect 
security stability. The global commons, subdivided as strategic and environmental, are 
areas in the world that all states share.185 Existing and emerging global powers are 
increasingly involved in the management of these global commons. The strategic 
commons that include sea, air, space, cyberspace, and nuclear domain are the areas most 
affected by the interplay of powerful states. In the perspective of Southeast Asia regional 
commons, the sea and air are the most affected areas of contention. A region is an area 
where numerous sea lines of communication and important chokepoints that make it 
highly significant in terms of military and economic aspect. Contending states continue to 
batter the strategic commons in promoting their national interests and foreign policy. 
Territorial expansions, logistical routes, and the need of natural resources influence the 
conflict of the strategic commons.  
As the dominant regional power, China aggressively invokes its territorial 
sovereignty in all disputed islands located within its surrounding waters. It considers the 
surrounding water as an extension of its territory and uses its maritime dominance to 
impose its claim.186 It has recently escalated the territorial boundary and ownership 
issues of the Senkaku, Paracel, and Spratly Island groups.187 For decades, the Republic of 
the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China were engaged in a dispute of 
sovereignty. The dispute stemmed from the claimant country’s assertion of their 
respective sovereignty in uninhabited rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks, shoals, islands, 
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reefs, and surrounding waters. China invoked the ambiguous “nine-dash line” that 
defined China’s territorial claim that includes most of the South China Sea.188 China 
based its sovereignty claims on an historical context, on the grounds of ancient maps and 
literary accounts from its second century B.C. Chinese seafarers.189 On the other hand, 
the Philippines based its claim on the enacted Presidential Decree No. 1596, signed by 
Ferdinand Marcos in June 11, 1978, because of geographical proximity. To substantiate 
its claim, the GPH conformed to the updated provisions of the United Nations 
Conventions on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) in 1994. The UNCLOS states that 
countries are allowed to control the resources in their exclusive economic zones (EEZ), 
which are defined as the distance from a country’s shoreline that extends 200 nautical 
miles offshore. The dispute stems not only by the reason of sovereignty, but also because 
of the military and geostrategic importance of the area and its vast marine and oil 
resources. 
China’s growing economy and power influenced its drive to protect its main 
supply route, economic and maritime source, and its strategic geopolitical advantage in 
the SCS. In order to achieve this, China had to establish some instruments of control and 
authority to operationalize its claim over its surrounding waters. On July 20, 2012, China 
proclaimed the creation of the Sansha City prefecture in the contested Paracel Islands 
empowered to oversee the entire South China Sea together with all of the disputed areas 
to include Spratly Island groups and Macclesfield Bank.190 It established in Sansha a 
PLA military garrison, with a division-level command of the Hainan provincial 
subcommand tasked to direct military operations and managed Sansha’s defense 
mobilization and military reserves.191 Sansha City acts as the administrative center for its 
claims in the SCS that progressively and methodically establishes legitimacy for its 
claims in the region. Their stationed military units, specifically in the navy, serve as 
                                                 
188 BBC News Asia, “Q & A: South China Sea Dispute,” BBC News Asia, sec. Asia, May 8, 2014, 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349. 
189 Keri Phillips, “Is this a Rock or an Island? The Tiny Differences that Could Define a Region,” 
ABC Radio, sec. Rear Vision, December 10, 2013. 
190 Oriana Skylar Mastro, The Sansha Garrison: China’s Deliberate Escalation in the South China 
Sea, Center for New American Security (2012).  
191 Ibid. 
 59
coercive forces in subduing developmental plans and economic undertakings of other 
claimant states in the SCS. China’s action increased the regional tension with the 
Philippines and Vietnam in which they condemned the Chinese action as an infringement 
of their respective sovereignty. 
Historically, China has employed multiple strategies in asserting its claim of 
sovereignty. China’s new military posture and its ability to maintain maritime superiority 
in the South China Sea tilted the regional balance of power. As an uncontested regional 
power, China executed its strategic doctrines and policies by physically demonstrating its 
powerful military might. It employed multi-dimension strategy to implement its 
sovereignty and in addressing island disputes through assertive creeping invasion, quick 
seizure, and the non-lethal maritime confrontation and area denial tactics.  
Through its “assertive creeping strategy,” China established a greater physical 
presence in the South China Sea by occupying shoals, reefs, and islands without the use 
of military force.192 This creeping invasion was a combined diplomatic and military 
strategy. First, China used the diplomacy with deception against a targeted state. China 
would declare the sovereignty and non-negotiability of the islands and would promise a 
bilateral peaceful resolution of the dispute based on international law. In addition, China 
would offer joint economic ventures and joint developments of natural resources with the 
claimant state. However, China would lay down territorial markers discreetly as the first 
step. If the markers remain uncontested for a period, China will erect building 
foundations and structures during the monsoon season.193 The structures symbolized 
China’s sovereignty over the disputed area.194 Chinese seizure and occupation of the 
targeted disputed shoal demonstrated its resilient and non-confrontational use of military 
forces that do not attract international attention. This Chinese action is reminiscent of its 
occupation of the Mischief Shoal in the South China Sea in January 1995. In March 
2014, the GPH divulged China’s massive reclamation activities on five reefs located in 
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the disputed area.195 Chinese dredging reclamation operations were continuous to this 
date that included the Johnson South reef, Cuarteron reef, Hughes reef, Gaven reef, and 
Eldad, which would eventually turn them into artificial islands.196  
Reportedly, because of the expansion of China’s occupied reefs, the disputed area 
supported China’s continuing efforts to harden its sovereignty claim in the SCS. In 
addition, concerned parties assessed that China plans to build an airstrip in the Johnson 
South reef, and the Fiery Cross reef, to implement its planned AIDZ.197 However, the 
Philippines continue to challenge China through diplomatic and legal means. In response, 
China resorted to its diplomatic channel to explain its action as James Hardy comments, 
“Beijing continues to defend its right to create the islands although its logic is sometimes 
impenetrable.”198 
By way of contrast, China would prefer an immediate military action to capture a 
disputed island as dictated by circumstances. In 1988, Chinese naval frigates sunk two 
Vietnamese ships at Johnson Reef, leaving 64 sailors dead, which popularized this 
incident as the massacre of the Vietnamese Navy.199 In addition, in January 1996, 
China’s willingness to use force in asserting its sovereignty led to a 90-minute gun battle 
between the Philippine Navy and the Chinese Navy in the Campones Island vicinity.200 
China consistently used its military might for coercive purposes and in some instances to 
execute its foreign policy. Hence, it could not be discounted the imminence of armed 
conflict in the SCS. 
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Currently, China adopts a coercive strategy stance combining increased 
aggressive military operations in the SCS, with corresponding subtle diplomatic gestures 
to targeted states. Its strategy is to take possession of islands, reefs, and outcrops in the 
South China Sea through a calculated use of intimidation but avoiding any major 
confrontation. Evidently, China has implemented a unique area denial operations and 
active non-lethal confrontation tactics in the SCS; its objective is to enforce positive 
control over contested islands and invoke regional supremacy. Its strategy has earned the 
monikers ‘salami slicing’ and ‘cabbage strategies.’ These two contemporary strategies 
gain notoriety for its efficiency in the execution of China’s core strategy of controlling 
the SCS. China’s action escalated the conflict at the SCS in a different perspective. The 
effective control of China over the SCS created a domino effect that transcended from a 
regional to a worldwide proportion. 
Robert Haddick describes China’s ‘salami strategy’ “as the slow accumulation of 
small actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major 
strategic change.”201 China had preconceived military overtures in the SCS burden that 
affected its adversary’s execution of persuasive intervening military actions. By 
employing this strategy, China rationalizes its actions and transferred the burden of 
unjustifiable intervention toward its adversary. The Chinese policy put its adversary into 
an adamant position in countering its ambiguous actions, which in turn lead to a non-
action of its adversary. Haddick explains 
A salami-slicer puts the burden of disruptive action on his adversary. That 
adversary will be in the uncomfortable position of drawing seemingly 
unjustifiable red lines and engaging in indefensible brinkmanship.202  
In April 2012, a Philippine Navy (PN) Frigate, Gregorio Del Pilar, apprehended 
Chinese Fishermen for illegally harvesting corals and capturing endangered species in the 
Scarborough Shoal located 125 nautical miles from Philippine coasts and 500 miles from 
                                                 




the nearest Chinese port.203 China accused the Philippines of militarizing of what should 
have been a law enforcement action that legitimized China’s use of force. A two-month 
faceoff ensued between the PN frigate against a 90-vessel Chinese armada consisting of 
maritime surveillance ships and fishing boats. The Chinese has coerced the Philippines in 
releasing the captured fishermen and deceived the Philippines in ending the standoff 
through a combined strategy of diplomatic and military gambits.204 The tense standoff 
ended in June of 2012, when the U.S. intervened. Allegedly, the three nations made a 
compromise wherein the Philippine and Chinese naval vessels were to disengage in the 
standoff and leave Scarborough Shoal.205 Regrettably, the deal did not materialize, as 
China deceivingly maintained its maritime presence in the shoal stating that they never 
signed a written agreement. As a result, China compromised the Philippines’ sovereignty. 
As of this time, China maintains an effective control of the Scarborough Shoal and its 
surrounding waters through a continuous naval presence. Since this incident, China has 
effectively used the salami slicing in controlling the SCS and gained a slight geopolitical 
upper hand. Haddick asserts that China has placed the U.S. in a dilemma, as he stated: 
Both the global and U.S. economies depend on freedom of navigation 
through the sea; $5.3 trillion of global trade passes through the South 
China Sea each year, $1.2 trillion of which passes through U.S. ports. 
Second, the United States has a strong interest in preventing any power 
from unilaterally rewriting well-established international maritime law to 
its liking. Finally, the credibility of the U.S. alliance system and its 
reliability as a security partner will be at stake.206  
In another effort to maintain a tight control of the SCS, China operationalized its 
‘cabbage strategy.’ Major General Zhang Zhaozhong of the PLA disclosed China’s 
‘cabbage strategy’ to recover all contested islands and reefs allegedly owned by China 
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that were illegally occupied by the Philippines publicly.207 Taking a cue from the recent 
Scarborough Shoal victory, China has effectively used its combined maritime forces to 
blockade the areas around the shoal. He described the active role of the fishing 
administration ships and maritime surveillance ships in providing an outward perimeter 
naval blockade while its flotilla of Chinese vessels served as its secondary and inner 
security. Thus, the Chinese surrounded a targeted island like a ‘cabbage,’ minimizing the 
probability of intrusion. Zhaozhong revealed China’s plan of resorting to this calculated 
strategy to recapture inadequately manned islands and reefs occupied by other states.208 
He argues that by employing this strategy to undermanned outposts, China can 
effectively blockade resupply operation of the targeted island.209 
On May 8, 2013, three Chinese naval ships arrived at the Philippine-occupied 
Second Thomas Shoal and operationalized its ‘cabbage strategy.’210 The shoal, located 
105 nautical miles west of Palawan Island and situated within the 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone of the Philippines, served as an access to the oil and mineral-rich Reed 
Bank. A small contingent of Philippine marines guarded the reef aboard a WW II-era 
vessel, the BRP Sierra Madre, a commissioned Philippine Navy ship, grounded 
intentionally in the Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 as a response to China’s unlawful 
occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995.211 It served as a permanent GPH installation that 
symbolized the sovereignty of the Philippines over the shoal. China’s imposition of its 
‘cabbage strategy’ over the reef affected the resupply of the marines, and China 
threatened to tow the vessel away. In response, the Philippines warned China that an 
aggressive action in the reef constituted an aggressive action against the Philippines that 
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triggered the United States to act in accordance with the provision of the 1951 MDT.212 
Philippines law professor Harry Roque, an international law expert, explained that the 
Second Thomas Shoal was part of the Philippine’s continental shelf that conferred its 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and the presence of a Philippine commissioned ship in 
the reef made the provisions of the MDT applicable.213 
China’s Asia-Pacific expansion, specifically in the Southeast Asian region, will 
continue to persist specifically in the SCS. The presence of numerous interconnecting key 
SLOC and chokepoints in the Southeast Asian region make it strategically significant to 
global and regional players. The strategic geopolitical and economic importance of the 
SCS functions as the influencing factors why states compete for its control. The SCS 
serves as a critical link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It functions as the main 
trade route and logistical route of oil and gas supply for the regional powers like China, 
South Korea, and Japan. In terms of economic significance, the SCS projects an 
important source of oil and fisheries supply. From a military perspective, the SCS serves 
as a strategic control area for China in the protection of its main supply route, and as a 
forward operating zone for its quest for Asia-Pacific expansion. Thus, China would 
maintain its stance of the non-negotiability of the SCS issue and its claim of indisputable 
sovereignty over the area. As part of its long-term strategy, the China threat will continue 
to persist and change the security outlook in the SCS. 
The GPH acknowledges that the SCS issue and China’s assertive expansion needs 
a multilateral solution. In his statement, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III said, 
“we cannot agree to bilateral talks to solve the problem because we think the problem is 
multilateral, a multilateral problem has to be settled multilaterally.”214 The GPH is aware 
that the dispute involves several states with overlapping EEZ. It is worth noting the 
Southeast Asian region is composed of archipelagic nations in which bodies of water 
define boundaries. In this aspect, a bilateral negotiation with any state in the resolution of 
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the dispute is futile. Furthermore, the GPH is aware that China has consistently 
pronounced its unwillingness for the negotiation of the SCS issue. In diplomatic parlance, 
China’s action manifests a non-negotiable posture; however, China conveys willingness 
for a cooperative talk without any states laying claims on the SCS. 
In the meantime, the Philippines employ the “Triple Action Plan” (TAP). The 
TAP comprises three simultaneous approaches aimed to address the escalating tensions 
and to resolve maritime disputes peacefully in the South China Sea and the West 
Philippine Sea through arbitration. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
announces its contemporary specific approach where it would call for immediate 
stoppage of tension-escalating activities such as massive reclamation, the prompt 
implementation of the code of conduct and acknowledgement of the 2002 ASEAN-China 
Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, and establishment of an 
international law-based mechanism to manage and resolve the SCS dispute.215 
On September 29, 2014, Foreign Affairs Secretary, Albert F. Del Rosario, 
pursued the support of UN Member States for the Philippines during the general debate 
of the 69th session of the UN General Assembly.216 Del Rosario cited current 
destabilizing activity in the SCS that threatens peace, security, and stability in the region 
and specifically stressed China’s coercive occupation of Scarborough Shoal, massive 
land reclamation in some contested reefs in the Spratlys area, and imposition of fishing 
restrictions that violate Philippine sovereignty and its legal rights to utilize its EEZ and 
continental shelf.217 He explained that China’s activities infringed upon the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and opposed the 2002 ASEAN-China 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.218 He emphasized that 
China’s assertion of its expansive claim of irrefutable control over the SCS in the form of 
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the nine-dash line position as the core issue of the dispute.219 The Philippines believes 
that the resolution of dispute depends on the result of the filed arbitration in the UN that 
will clarify the maritime entitlements and will pave the way for the full resolution of the 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea.220 
3. The CNN and the Philippine Communist Insurgency 
The contemporary Philippine Communist Insurgency (PCI) led by the CNN is the 
longest running communist insurgency in the world.221 The GPH considers the CNN as 
the most potent internal security threat.222 The CNN insurgency traces its roots from the 
defeated HUK insurgency in the late 1950. Rectifying from the mistakes of the HUK 
insurgency, the CNN managed to evolve into an organized and cohesive organization. 
Relatively, the CNN’s transformation was a result of defensive response of its leadership 
to counter the various counterinsurgency strategy executed by the GPH. 
The CNN is composed of a party, a unified front, and an army: the Communist 
Party of the Philippines (CPP), the National Democratic Front (NDF), and the New 
People’s Army (NPA). The CPP founded in 1968 by Jose Maria Sison aligns with the 
combined principles of Mao Zedong’s ‘peasant’s war’ and Marxist-Leninist 
“revolutionary working class struggle.” Using a combined Maoist-Marxist-Leninist 
dictum, the CNN wages an enduring armed and political struggle efficiently against the 
GPH. Its armed component, the NPA, continues to wage a protracted war in the 
countryside using the peasantry as a mass base and a source of guerilla fighters. The 
Protracted People’s War uses the peasantry in the armed and political struggles 
encompassing the cities from the rural area as a core strategy to overthrow the regime and 
seize the political control.  
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For the first quarter in 2013, the AFP estimated the number of NPA members at 
4,386 with 5,192 firearms affecting 1,083 villages. The provinces in the Eastern 
Mindanao composed the high concentration of affected villages where exploitable socio-
political and economic issues abound and used by the NPA in its expansion and 
recruitment activities. The NPA heightened its attacks initiating 230 violent incidents 
attributed to the CPP directive to conduct tactical offensives. This directive is in 
connection with the stalled peace talks and the election period that provided the NPA and 
opportunity to support its fielded political candidates and conduct financial extortions. In 
addition, the NPA heightened tactical offensives on private security agencies and 
business firms in this area increases its number of high-powered firearms. In addition, the 
NPA acquires firearms from politicians as payment for the permit to campaign policy that 
allows them a free-access in the guerilla zone. 
The NDF served as a legal front and umbrella of various sectoral and mass groups 
it organized in the urban area. As a connected network, the CNN efficiently focused on 
overthrowing and replacing the present government with a national democratic system 
with a socialist perspective. It torments the GPH incessantly using its network in 
executing a combined armed and political struggle. In furtherance of its specific 
objective, the CNN through the NDF saw the excellent opportunity of advancing its 
strategic goal through a parliamentary struggle as provided by the GPH. The enactment 
of Republic Act 7941, Party-List System Act, legalized the representation of 
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties in the Philippine 
Congress.223 In connection with this, the CNN mobilized the NDF in consolidating and 
legitimizing its aboveground and underground component to participate in the 
parliamentary struggle by participating in national and local elections. The CNN unifies 
and legitimizes its underground and aboveground fronts to be able to participate on these 
democratic exercises. In the 2013 election, the CNN has successfully fielded political 
candidates. In the 2013 election, five out of nine CNN-supported party list groups, 
identified as the Makabayan Coalition, won which authorized them to occupy a total of 
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seven congressional seats.224 The coalition includes the CNN-supported legal front group 
of the NDF that comprises Bayan Muna, Kabataan party-list, ACT Teachers party-list, 
GABRIELA Women’s party list, and Anak Pawis.225 Likewise, the CNN also supported 
57 local candidates, 23 of them elected in different political positions. The entry of the 
communist leaning party-list groups and several key personalities in the pillars of the 
GPH provided a new political dynamics in the Philippines.  
At present, recent CPP directives guide the current thrusts of the CNN. The CPP 
issued the “Seven Task Points” during the CPP’s 45th Founding Anniversary on 
December 26, 2013, and the “Ten Fighting Tasks” prescribed during the 45th NPA 
founding anniversary on March 29, 2014. The two directives revealed the CNN emphasis 
on the active role of its united front. The CNN heightened its focus on the exploitation of 
major socio-political and economic issues, the creation of anti-government coalitions and 
the conduct of mass protests that manifests its intent to discredit the GPH. Currently, the 
CNN concentrates on alleged corruption of high-level government officials, 
mismanagement of government funds by some government agencies, and the Philippine-
U.S. alliance that they consider as an infringement to the Philippine sovereignty. The 
CNN tasked the NDF to execute its current thrust by sending several sectoral groups 
numbering to 5,000 to join the the 60,000 strong anti-government coalition’s group 
protest rally in condemning the misuse of government funds by some high-level 
government officials.226 Recently, numerous CNN-affiliated sectoral groups spearheaded 
condemnation rallies together with various groups and sectors against the alleged murder 
of a Filipino transgender by U.S. Marine personnel in Subic, Philippines.227 
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Consequently, the CNN’s affiliated sectoral fronts condemn the EDCA and the 
Philippine-U.S. alliance during their protest actions.228 
The CNN showed a significant decline in initiated violent activities in the first 
quarter of 2014 apparently caused by a shift in policy from an armed struggle towards the 
parliamentary struggle. Nevertheless, most of the CNN’s violent and non-violent 
activities focus on harassment, liquidations, and arsons to implement its extortion 
activities. The NPA as the coercive force continue to engage in extortion activities 
targeting business firms, politicians, and private personalities. In its fundraising activity, 
the NPA uses intimidation and violence targeting mining firms, companies involved in 
infrastructure projects and agricultural businesses. For the past years, the CNN drive to 
increase its financial capacity continues unabated. As a result, the CNN maintains its 
capacity to expand and recruit members despite the intensified counterinsurgency effort 
of the GPH. The unrestricted financial position of the CNN provides sustenance on its 
effort to recover loss mass base. For now, the CNN slowly consolidates its mass base by 
concentrating on Ideological, Political, and Organizational (IPO) works in the areas 
recently recovered by the government forces and in calamity-stricken areas. 
Yet, the CNN’s financial capacity that contributes to its resiliency for four 
decades remain unrestrained by the GPH. The CNN has effectively pressured the GPH to 
dissuade from curtailing its financial capacity. The CNN financial capacity breeds and 
sustains the resilient communist Insurgency in the Philippines. Justus Van Der Kroef 
argues that, “another criterion by which to measure the Philippine Communists’ ability to 
‘stalemate’ the government strategically, and a good index to communist strength 
generally is the movement’s financial resource.”229 In addition, Michael Freeman claims, 
“without money, terrorists can neither function as organizations, nor conduct attacks.”230 
He further asserts the need for governments to understand the financial complexities and 
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vulnerabilities of terrorist financing to combat terrorist organizations effectively.231 
Hence, there is a dire need for the GPH to focus on the financial capacity of the CNN. 
However, the GPH failed to disrupt the insurgent’s financial resources and the CNN even 
benefitted from the Philippine administrator’s actions. The Corazon Aquino regime 
invokes a political stance of a more pluralistic and democratic life which benefited the 
financial ability of the insurgents.232 In 1995, President Fidel Ramos, as a gesture of 
sincerity for the peace treaty with the insurgents, legalized the CNN by signing into law 
Republic Act 7636, which repealed Republic Act 1700 or better known as the Anti-
Subversion Act of 1957. The GPH’s action further benefited the CNN operationally and 
financially, and impaired the counterinsurgency effort. Only in one instance did the GPH 
formally investigate the financial ability of the CNN. In June 1998, the Philippine Senate 
conducted an inquiry on the nationwide rampant ‘taxation’ of the NPA on businessmen, 
farmers, fish pond owners, logging, transport companies, and other enterprises.233 For 
several years, the government failed to execute comprehensive legal action to counter the 
financial operations of the CNN. Nonetheless, the GWOT resulted to the listing of the 
CNN in the Foreign Terrorist Organization and designated as “terrorist” by the U.S., 
Canada, Britain, and the European Union (E.U.) in 2001, 2002, and 2007. This action 
curbs the external support of the CNN. Yet, the GPH failed to capitalize and exploit the 
FTO listing of the CNN in neutralizing the insurgent’s financial capacity. For the past 
years, there were no substantial reports of government’s actions or success in Counter 
Financing against the CNN. The peace negotiation influences the GPH’s subtle treatment 
on the CNN’s financial capacity. The CNN listing as an FTO was a significant issue 
between the Government and the CNN.   
On June 18, 2012, the Philippines enacted Republic Act No. 10168, The 
Terrorism Financing, Prevention, and Suppression Act of 2012, with an effective date of 
July 5, 2012. The law invoked terrorist financing a self-contained crime and empowered 
government enforcers of quick freezing of property or funds associated  to financing 
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terrorism or acts of terrorism that also includes the property or funds of individuals and 
entities on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267/1989 and 1988 
consolidated lists.234 Similarly, the Republic Act No. 10167 that was signed into law on 
June 18 and took effect on July 6, 2012, amended the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 
2001 that empowered the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to secretly inquire 
on banks for a limited period of time and allow courts to issue freeze orders on identified 
assets.235 Nevertheless, the Philippines government is more vulnerable in the non-profit 
sector when implementing these laws. The government lacks single supervisory authority 
responsible for monitoring and coordinating financial transactions of entities in the non-
profit sector.236 The existing non-profit regulatory bodies are inefficient in monitoring 
due to inadequate coordination and shortage of resources.237 
The CNN takes advantage of the vulnerability of the GPH by enhancing its 
lifeline. The CNN taps its two major components the NDF in the legal aspect of acquiring 
funds, and the NPA in conducting coercive illegal activities.238 The CPP central 
committee orders the NPA to conduct the extortion on the masses, businesses, and local 
politicians, while the NDF transacts external funding from foreign funding agencies and 
non-governmental organizations.239 Various government agencies estimate the CNN fund 
raising activities accumulated PHP 1,660,000,000.00 (USD 144 Million) in a span of ten 
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years (1987–2007).240 The NPA extorts small and big corporations, kidnap individuals, 
rob establishments and impose a nationwide extortion to firms and with an annual 
collection of U.S. $25 to $45 Million in 1988.241 In December 2010, the NPA imposed a 
U.S. $450,000 a month extortion fee and supply of computers, communication 
equipment, and guns to several mining companies operating in CARAGA region.242 In 
addition, during election periods, politicians are summoned to pay a fee or in kind for a 
‘permit to campaign’ and ‘permit to win’ in certain guerilla zones.243 The politicians 
either pay a certain amount of money or provide the insurgents with firearms, 
ammunitions, laptops, money-cards, communications equipment and other logistical 
materials worth millions of pesos.244 The CNN propagates extortion activities as a 
legitimate system to sustain the armed revolution considered a form of payment of the 
masses to the CNN’s revolutionary services in providing livelihood projects and 
developing cooperatives in the rural and urban areas, fighting the reactionary government 
security forces and for the cost of land reform struggle. The NPA’s effectiveness in 
conducting extortions or what they called as “revolutionary taxation” is attributed to its 
harshness in employing death threats and assassinations of uncooperative peasants, 
businessmen and politicians; arsons, bombing, raids and confiscations of multinational 
firm’s buildings and equipment; and other forms of violence and criminal activities such 
as kidnappings of uncooperative individuals and robberies of businesses.245 In 2010 and 
2011, the NPA conducted 18 raids on mining firms in Mindanao as a show of force and 
punishment to non-payers of the revolutionary tax.246 
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The unabated CNN accumulation of financial resources traces back for decades. 
The NDF utilized its legal and semi-legal cloak to accumulate an annual income of U.S. $ 
8 to $15 Million in 1987, from various external sources and non-government 
organizations of Australia, Europe, Asia, and North America.247 The NDF managed to 
establish foreign financial resource network for the CNN through International Solidarity 
Works (ISW) and Overseas Revolutionary Works (ORW) with like-minded 
organizations.248 Locally, the NDF uses its unified above and underground fronts such as 
trade union fronts, labor union groups, and church charitable organizations, as channels 
to generate fund support from international leftist groups and liberation movements.249 
The CNN further invested its collected funds through formation of cooperatives, 
venturing into small and large-scale industries and export ventures in the Philippine 
private sector. Moreover, the CNN funnels sixty percent of the solicited funds intended 
for legitimate income generating and community development projects.250 For the period 
of 1996–2007, the CNN earned PHP 1.15 billion (USD 25.6 million) through extortion 
and an external funding of PHP 113.5 million (USD 2.5 million) for a four-year period in 
1998–2001.251 Its relentless extortion activities yielded PHP 130 million (USD 2.9 
million) in 2009.252 Accordingly, the CNN allots 10–20 percent of the money to its 
armed component, and the remaining 80–90 percent remains in the CPP National Finance 
Committee; a hefty part of it used to sustain their leaders abroad.253 The CNN operates 
its army and unified fronts to generate revenue for self-sustainment. The financial 
capacity of the CNN enables them to operationalize and support planned strategic and 
tactical actions such as recruitment, expansion, mass mobilization, operational security, 
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military engagement, political agitation and lobbying, and international solidarity works 
to achieve the objectives of the revolution.  
In line with its political struggle, the CNN has used the peace talks as a means of 
creating maneuvering space. Since June 2011, the GPH-NDF Peace Talks maintain its 
stalemate status after the NDF requested for the postponement of the peace talks. The 
contentious issue that causes the stalemate is on the request of the unconditional release 
of all detained alleged Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantee (JASIG) 
protected NDF personalities. The JASIG is a key agreement in the peace negotiation that 
serves as a mechanism that safeguards and provides immunity to authorized CNN 
members involved in the negotiation.254 Luis Jalandoni argued that the JASIG was 
impractical and accused the government of insincerity as it continues to arrest, allegedly 
torture, and kill JASIG-listed NDFP members.255 However, the GPH counterclaims that 
the CNN members use the JASIG to its advantage to avoid arrest and prosecution. Top 
CNN leaders took undue advantage of the JASIG using it as a strategic instrument to 
conduct IPO activities. In several events, the CNN used the JASIG as an alibi to 
stalemate the peace talk and in pressuring the government to release arrested high valued 
CNN leaders and members.  
The GPH’s unyielding stance on prosecuting recently arrested top CPP-NPA 
leaders turns the tide against the CNN. The arrest of Benito and Wilma Tiamzon, the top 
leaders of the NPA and the other seven high value CNN personalities generated a setback 
in the movement as manifested by the softening of the CNN stance. On December 26, 
2013, the CPP declared its intention not to pursue the peace negotiation with the Aquino 
regime citing multiple issues that includes but not limited to human rights violation, 
submission to U.S. foreign interest, corruption, and other environmental and social 
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issues.256 However, in a news report on October 20, 2014, the NDFP peace panel chair 
Luis Jalandoni expressed their willingness for the resumption of the peace talks with the 
GPH after their demand for the release of captured top communist leaders facing criminal 
cases failed.257 The NDFP claimed that the provision of JASIG accorded immunity to the 
jailed CNN leaders for they work as peace consultants that made their capture illegal.258 
Nonetheless, the government negotiators in charge of the peace process disregarded the 
NDFP’s argument, since most of the jailed rebels are using aliases.259 As manifested in 
the past, the CNN would resort to political pressure using its united front to advance its 
strategic goal and in undermining the GPH counterinsurgency strategy. Political 
maneuvering such as this indicates the CNN’s ability to influence the government. 
B. THE PHILIPPINE-U.S. ALLIANCE OPPORTUNITY  
The dynamics in the global and regional security arena influenced the foreign 
policy of the U.S. and the Philippines. It presented an opportunity for both nations to 
align priorities to satisfy their national interests. This section highlights the opportunity of 
the alliance because of the U.S. strategic pivot in the Asia-Pacific region. 
1. The U.S. Asia-Pacific Pivot 
For the first two decades of 2000, the Asia-Pacific region manifested a dynamic 
political, security, and economic atmosphere. China and India’s economic and political 
rise remain unabated. In the East Asian region, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, 
and the Philippines promised a better outlook on their economic status. On security 
issues, the East Asian region had various interests ranging from the North Korean nuclear 
threat, transnational terrorism, territorial disputes, and China’s assertive expansionism. 
The significant economic prospect and the security concerns influenced the U.S. 
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government to rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region. The de-escalation of conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2010 further persuaded the U.S. to realign its foreign 
policy towards the Asia-Pacific. Thus, in 2012, the U.S. articulated in its strategic 
guidance a strategic pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region. Its primordial aim is to secure 
common interests through strengthening existing alliances and expansion of networks 
that ensure a collective capability and capacity.260 The strategic guidance conveyed the 
role of the U.S. in the maintenance of peace, stability, and the free flow of commerce and 
the maintenance of its influence. Its success would depend on the balance of U.S. military 
capability and presence in the Asia-Pacific region.261 The U.S. intends to maintain its 
presence and access within the region, and it will continue to work with its allies and 
keep its treaty obligation.262 However, present trend shows that the conflict in Iraq is 
escalating and that the Afghanistan conflict is likely to intensify as U.S. troops starts to 
withdraw. These events may affect the U.S. strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. 
The U.S. strategic pivot matters most to the Philippines. Filipino leaders believed 
that the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific would balance the supremacy of China and 
influence the territorial and maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific. The threat of 
transnational terrorist also influenced the Philippines to engage the U.S. in various 
bilateral dialogues. In June 2009, the Philippines and the U.S. defense officials convened 
in the Philippine-U.S. Strategic Dialogue in Manila. The dialogue facilitated the 
discussion and cooperation on security strategic issues among defense officials from the 
U.S. and the Philippines. The dialogue complements the robust military-to-military 
cooperation between Philippines and U.S. forces, as outcomes of the dialogue would 
provide policy guidance to MDB-SEB activities. The bilateral strategic dialogue centered 
on bilateral alliance concerns, and regional and global issues focusing on defense and 
security. This framework is essential in the formulation of roadmaps on critical military 
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issues such as the assessment and review of the relevance and future of the JSOTF-P and 
transition of Internal Security Operations to Territorial Defense.  
Prior to the U.S. strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. and the Philippines 
had already initiated the strengthening of their security cooperation caused by the threat 
of terrorism and Chinese military adventurism in the South China Sea. As the U.S. 
rebalance in the Asia-Pacific region, strengthening the tie with the Philippines has 
become a priority. The U.S. security commitment with the Philippines bounded by the 
MDT would test the dynamics of the alliance. In connection with this, both parties 
reached for a political consensus to strengthen the alliance. On November 16, 2011, in 
time of the 60th anniversary of the Philippine-U.S. MDT of 1951, Secretary of State, 
Hillary Clinton, and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Albert F. Del Rosario, 
signed the “Manila Declaration” that reaffirmed the treaty as the foundation of the 
existing bilateral security relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines.263 It 
reaffirmed the parties’ obligation under the MDT. The declaration also promotes the 
sustained cooperation on counterterrorism, regional security, and economic partnership. 
Furthermore, it also reaffirmed transparency and rule of law. Moreover, in her speech, 
Clinton asserted that the U.S. stance on neutrality in the regional territorial disputes, 
national interest in freedom of navigation, and multilateral peaceful solutions of maritime 
disputes through diplomatic processes were in line with established international law.264 
Rhetorically, she further stated, “the United States will always be in the corner of the 
Philippines, and we will stand and fight with you.”265 The declaration fortified the 
Philippine-U.S. alliance and consequently its frameworks of engagements enhanced the 
ability of the parties to respond and challenge existential traditional and non-traditional. 
The Philippines in particular boosted its armed forces capacity through these frameworks. 
It elevated the Armed Forces of the Philippines credibility as an alliance partner. 
On April 8, 2012, Philippine and Chinese maritime security forces engaged in a 
standoff in the Scarborough Shoal located 120 nautical miles from Manila’s west coast. 
                                                 




The event triggered the convening of the first United States-Philippines Ministerial 
Dialogue. On April 30, 2012, a Two-Plus-Two Ministerial Consultations transpired in 
Washington, D.C., between the U.S. and the Philippines representatives. The meeting 
highlights the U.S. pledge to honor its obligations under the MDT. It also set the 
Philippines-U.S. activities and exercises standards to have a high impact and great value 
on responding to maritime security concerns and natural disasters. The meeting also 
guaranteed the Philippines a $30 Million increase in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
for 2013 and the prioritization of the Philippines in Excess Defense Article (EDA) grants. 
The meeting also stipulated the future transfer of JSOTF-P capabilities to the AFP. For 
the alliance to become more efficient, the meeting also demands a greater and facilitated 
information sharing. It also orders the United States to provide naval and air assets in a 
rotational basis to serve as capability gap fillers for the Philippines. To sum it all, the 
ministerial meeting seeks to improve the Philippine-U.S. security relations and most 
importantly, to develop a credible defense posture for the Philippines.  
Recently, the U.S. and the Philippines marked another milestone in enhancing the 
alliance. On April 28, 2014, Philippine Secretary of National Defense, Voltaire Gazmin, 
and U.S. Ambassador, Philip Goldberg, signed the 10-year Philippines-United States 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (Philippine-U.S. EDCA). The EDCA, 
anchored on the 1951 MDT and 1998 VFA, restated the peaceful resolution of 
international disputes through legal means, while prohibiting the use of force by the 
parties involved. As an implementing guideline of the MDT and VFA, it envisioned to 
advance the implementation of the MDT. The EDCA allows the entry of U.S. military 
troops for exercises, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations, as stated in 
the Philippine-US MDB-SEB of the 1998 VFA. It authorizes the co-location of U.S. 
troops in specified Armed Forces of the Philippines facilities. It also permits the United 
States increased deployment of troops, ships, aircraft, and humanitarian equipment in the 
Philippines. Moreover, the EDCA promotes the AFP capacity building meant to enhance 
its ability to confront traditional and non-traditional threats. In his speech, Ambassador 
Goldberg asserts that the EDCA “supports the shared goal of promoting the long-term 
modernization of the AFP, and will to help the AFP maintain and develop maritime 
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security, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
capabilities.”266 He further states that the agreement respects the Philippine Sovereignty 
and the non-establishment of permanent U.S. presence.267 According to Secretary 
Gazmin, the agreement deepened the Philippine-U.S. relationship and as a framework, it 
enhanced the alliance.268 He further stated that the Philippine-U.S. alliance and 
mechanisms continually evolve in order to cope up with the complexity of defense and 
security challenges.269  
The signing of the EDCA stirs the Philippine public opinion. The Filipino 
nationalists and the liberal group question the constitutionality and one-sidedness of the 
EDCA. In one news commentary, it says that the “EDCA is a document so detestable it 
makes a mockery of the Philippine Constitution and ridicules Philippine Sovereignty.”270 
In one of the provisions of the EDCA allows the U.S. sovereignty over a precise location 
inside a Philippine military camp that curtails inaccessibility to Philippine officials in the 
absence of the U.S. consent. It connotes the violation of one of the elements of the state 
of sovereignty that is the supreme right of the state to command obedience within the 
state. Furthermore, Senator Miriam Santiago insists that the EDCA need the Senate 
concurrence to ensure that the agreement is in pursuance to the Philippines national 
interests.271 Santiago cited: 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 46, provided 
that if a state’s consent to be bound by a treaty had been expressed in 
violation of its constitution, the state may invoke that violation as a ground 
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for invaliding its consent, if the violation was manifest and concerned a 
rule of internal law of fundamental importance.272  
She further asserts that there are three constitutional provisions that contradict the 
EDCA. First, there is a provision that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid 
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate” 
(Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21).273 Second, there is a provision that: “after the expiration in 
1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of 
American concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, shall not 
be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate” 
(Constitution, Art. 18, Sec. 25).274 Third, there is a provision that “the Philippines, 
consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear 
weapons in its territory” (Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 8).275  
The GPH advocates that the EDCA be in line with the constitution for it merely 
implements the established government policies in the 1951 MDT and the 1998 VFA.276 
Nonetheless, various interested groups and individuals filed three petitions in the 
Philippine Supreme court to challenge the constitutionality of the EDCA.277 Petitioners 
various claims includes the violation of the constitutional provisions on the “preferential 
use of Filipino labor and domestic materials; tax exemption; national sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and national interest; freedom from nuclear weapons; role of the 
judiciary in settling disputes; autonomy of local government units; and treaties with other 
countries, specifically, military treaties.”278 The final passage of the EDCA met with 
backlashes from both the government legislative bodies and private interested groups. 
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The foremost obstacle to the EDCA is the left leaning progressive Filipino nationalists 
groups fighting for their respective principles. Compared to past parallel cases, the EDCA 
will undergo relentless scrutiny to ensure its constitutionality. As in previous cases, the 
EDCA presents an exploitable issue for the political posturing and battle cry for the 
interested groups. 
C. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The GWOT and the fight against the ASG in Southern Philippines is a shared 
threat for the alliance members. The transnational character of the terrorist group and its 
link to AQ and JI make it a legitimate target for both the United States and the 
Philippines. In line with Walt’s definition of the alliance, the ASG is a security 
commitment for the alliance to confront which will allow the alliance members to reap 
mutual benefits. A combined effort between the Philippine and U.S. forces in terms of 
resources exchange and capacity development is expected to confront this threat. As 
discussed in this chapter, the alliance became more potent as the alliance capacity to 
confront the threat improved through joint training and increased foreign military aid to 
the Philippines. As Walt has asserted, the foreign aid and the presence of common 
interests made the alliance more efficient. 
The threat of terrorism in the Southern Philippines functions as a cohering factor 
rather than as a liability to the alliance. The extremist terrorist groups are confined within 
certain areas in Southern Philippines and do not constitute an overall threat to the 
Philippines. The alliance establishment of counterterrorism objectives, operational 
mechanisms, and joint development project ensures the continuous clipping of the 
Islamic terrorist organizations operating in Mindanao. The ongoing peace process 
between the GPH and the MILF would serve as a buffer in the possible merging of 
terrorism and secessionism ideology. However, the GPH must be wary that the failure of 
the peace process and the failure to disarm the MILF would be catastrophic to the internal 
security. The GPH and the alliance must continue to seek mechanisms and establish 
contingencies. It would ensure that the Philippines are well prepared with an active stance 
and would not resort to hasty reactionary actions.  
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The overwhelming, threatening power, aggressive intent, and proximity of China, 
influenced the Philippines to balance with the United States. This is in consonance with 
Walt’s balance of threat theory. China poses a significant threat to the Philippine 
sovereignty so that it needs a greater power to balance against this threat, not based on 
regional or global power, but on the aspect of the threat. 
China’s assertive expansion is a shared threat of the alliance. The China threat 
undermines the Philippine-U.S. alliance and challenges the national interests of the 
United States and the Philippines. Significantly, China’s threat is a complicated and 
lingering problem for the alliance to confront. The governments of the United States and 
China have an existing strategic relation, which influences the decision making and 
action of the United States. For the Philippines, its economic ties with China affect the 
overall strategy in confronting the SCS dispute. The Armed Forces of the Philippines’ 
inability to defend its territory due to its weak deportment aggravates the situation. Even 
with the presence of the alliance with the United States, the Philippines has to contend 
with other forms of dispute resolution. The Philippines has to discard military solutions. 
The present-day posture of the Philippines influences the Philippine-U.S. alliance 
strategy in dealing with the SCS issue. Maintaining a defensive posture is in line with the 
Philippine Constitution. Based on the constitution, the Philippines posture should always 
be on the defensive. It cannot initiate a war for the purpose of aggression, but it can 
respond to foreign aggression as a form of self-defense. Furthermore, it abides with the 
principles of international law, the UN Charter, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
Southeast Asia that stipulates that international disputes must be settled through peaceful 
means.  
From an alliance perspective, direct military action to disentangle the conflict is 
impractical but probable. China’s aggressive military overtures could lead to a shooting 
war with other claimants in the SCS. China’s wanton disregard of diplomatic and legal 
resolutions and its ambiguity on its stance in the SCS aggravate the dispute. Hence, the 
SCS dispute is a strategic problem that could disconnect the alliance depending on the 
steps taken by United States and the Philippines. As discussed, the China threat is a 
regional problem that needs a multilateral solution. If a multilateral solution is not 
 83
achieved, the SCS dispute will remain a potential flashpoint that can trigger a regional or 
global conflict. 
Led by the CNN, the PCI is an unshared threat for the Philippine-U.S. alliance. 
Considered as the top security threat by the GPH, the CNN remains unprioritized in the 
alliance threat assessment. The unaligned threat assessment of the United States and the 
Philippines about the CNN affects the efficiency of the alliance. Of all the threats 
mentioned, the CNN stands as the immediate obstacle to the alliance. The CNN continues 
to pester the alliance with political actions and with its information campaign; the 
Philippine-U.S. military relationship is under constant attack and branded as the scourge 
of the Philippine society. The CNN and its network manage to influence the Filipino 
people to stand against the alliance, and it has continuously used it as a propaganda tool 
for the insurgency. The CNN’s political arm has expanded through the years. Its 
influence has spread not only to the local level but also into the national level. The 
CNN’s continuous rectification of its past mistakes has also enhanced its ability to wage a 
combined political and armed struggle against the GPH. Its recent thrust reveals its 
strength in the political arena as its unified legal front and networks managed to infiltrate 
GPH agencies and legislative systems. Using the party-list system and its unified legal 
system, it has managed to motivate and mobilize all sectors to include private and 
government ones. The political action is more dangerous than the armed struggle when it 
comes to the alliance. The presence of loopholes and ambiguity in the alliance serves as 
its weak points that the CNN can exploit. Thus, the CNN threat, particularly in the 
political conflict and its status as an unshared threat, serves as a potential disconnecting 
factor to the Philippine-U.S. alliance if it remains uncontested. 
The United States’ Asia-Pacific strategic pivot offers an opportunity for the 
strengthening of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. The Philippines and the United States for 
the past six decades continue to nurture their bilateral relationship. The ever-changing 
security challenges continue to hound and test the alliance’s durability. The alliance’s 
flexibility to cope up with these challenges manifests in its ability to create feasible 
mechanisms. However, as history shows, the problem of the interested groups will 
continue to batter the alliance’s foundation and mechanisms. As long as the requirements 
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of the MDT of 1951 and other security implements are not resolved, the alliance will 
continue to suffer its effect. The vagueness of the provisions of the MDT could drag other 
mechanisms into its inefficacy. The non-alignment of the U.S. and Philippine 
perspectives on the alliance pummels the relationship. While most Filipinos have viewed 
the military alliance as a shield and sword in the event of external aggression, the 
Americans have manifested a non-commitment. Filipinos see the alliance as a one-sided 
affair which favors the United States and puts the Philippines at a greater risk. The 
Filipinos look at the alliance as a form of control in the U.S. strategic interest to use the 
Philippines as a buffer to constrain China.  
The EDCA further solidified the Filipino belief that it does not obligate the 
United States to protect the Philippines in the event of war with China in the West 
Philippine Sea. The EDCA requires the Philippines and United States to resolve disputes 
between themselves without third-party interference, which is problematic for it requires 
exclusive high-level executive negotiations as the contrivances to settle disputes. 
Furthermore, the EDCA contributes to the further deterioration of the Philippine and 
Chinese relationship. The vague stance of the United States in the South China Sea 
conflict further emboldens China’s assertive posturing and gunboat policy. The 
Philippines expects that with or without an alliance, the disputes could escalate into a 
higher level of conflict. On the positive side, the EDCA offers an opportunity for the 
Philippines to hasten its armed forces modernization in developing a credible defense 
force that can be achieved through U.S. military assistance. The public outcry of the 
interested groups should not hinder the primary aim of the EDCA of developing the AFP 
capacity by capitalizing on the U.S. assisted training and material support. The GPH must 
focus on its end goal of strengthening its armed forces and the Philippine-U.S. alliance. It 
must show resilience in confronting the challenge of the domestic socio-political 
upheaval caused by a minority group. What is important is the ability for the GPH to 
cope up with the dynamics of the foreign policy and international relations fluidity. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Walt’s balance of threat theory predicts the formation and management of the 
Philippine-U.S. alliance. The theory suggests that, given current trends, the Philippines 
and the United States will continue to rely on the alliance to achieve shared interests. The 
Philippines and United States are bound by a shared ideology, common existential 
threats, and the presence of mutual benefits, which ensures that the alliance will endure. 
The only misgiving with this theory is that it does not cover the effects of internal threats 
in the alliance. Nonetheless, the theory implies that the level of commitment would 
include the resolution of internal conflict that affects the alliance. Even so, Walt’s theory 
explains the threat factor and other main principles that influence the dynamics of the 
Philippine-U.S. alliance. 
Threats helps both ways that they can either strengthen or weaken the Philippine-
U.S. alliance, thus they influence its direction. In summary, threats serve as a catalyst in 
the foundation, development, demise, and revitalization of the contemporary PH-U.S. 
alliance. In the positive aspect, history showed that threats are the primary factor in the 
founding and formalization of the alliance. Threat served as the impetus for the 
revitalization of the alliance in the early 2000s. In addition, the wide spectrums of threats 
have influenced the establishment and reformulation of alliance mechanisms. These 
mechanisms increased the efficiency of the alliance for they served as instruments of the 
alliance-members in executing their stated responsibility towards the achievement of their 
shared objectives. These mechanisms increased the aggregate power and efficiency of the 
PH-U.S. alliance because it paved the way to the development of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines. 
However, threats can also undermine the alliance. The various threats that have 
challenged the alliance significantly prevented the achievement of its full potential. The 
uncoordinated approach of the alliance members with respect to the existential threats has 
created an atmosphere of distrust and ambiguity. Furthermore, the alliance has to deal 
with another type of problem in the form of challenge by political entities and domestic 
audience. These factors have weakened the posture of the alliance. Hitherto, traditional 
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and non-traditional threats have fueled the continuous operation of the alliance. As shown 
in this study, shared and unshared threats could serve as disconnecting factors in the 
alliance. Hence, the threats affecting the alliance in a different purview need a different 
approach.  
The China threat constitutes a disconnecting element to the alliance. China’s 
actions and the South China Sea (SCS) dispute can be viewed as a political rather than a 
military problem. Its economic influence in the Philippines and its strategic relationship 
with the United States affects the action of both nations. China’s strategic ambiguity 
concerning the resolution of the SCS dispute, its assertive expansion in the Asia-Pacific 
region, and the United State’s ambivalent response to the Philippines security-
sovereignty dilemma, influence the foreign policy of the three nations. Regarding the 
SCS dispute, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines  most feasible approach 
is through a multilateral diplomatic and legal solution, yet it must use the alliance to 
mitigate China’s military actions. Moreover, the ambiguity of the 1951 Mutual Defense 
Treaty’s  provision created the sovereignty-security dilemma that disconnects the 
Philippines and the United States. Historically, this dilemma has remained unresolved 
since the beginning of the Cold War. Considering China’s relentless threatening actions 
and the unresolved expected response of the United States in line with the MDT, the PH-
U.S. alliance’s future is uncertain. The China threat specifically on the SCS dispute and 
the MDT will continue to serve as disconnecting factors and an issue for the PH-U.S. 
alliance. 
Regarding its unshared threats, the CNN presents a gap that impedes the full 
potential of the PH-U.S. alliance. The dwindling number of NPA’s armed offensives does 
not indicate the weakening of the CNN. It suggests the CNN’s strategic maneuver to 
concentrate on the political rather than on armed struggle. It also reveals that the NPA 
committed atrocities to coerce the masses in their extortion activities. Similarly, the NDF 
uses its united front and foreign networks to increase its financial capacity. The combined 
efforts of its armed and political components have propelled the overall financial capacity 
of the CNN that contributes to its resilience. Unchecked, the CNN could elevate its 
military ability to conduct violent and devastating armed offensives. Its unified legal 
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front continues to conduct a political struggle and infiltration of the government pillars 
that could harm the alliance and the GPH in the near future. The CNN constitutes a 
disconnecting factor that will continue to vex the alliance with damaging political and 
propaganda overtures. 
The current thrust of the CNN shows that it is concentrating on the political 
struggle, which should serve as a potential warning for the GPH to strategize for this new 
battlefront. The CNN leadership knows that the political war is the most potent 
instrument for undermining the legitimacy of the GPH. For decades, the CNN has 
rectified its political blunders and intensified its political offensives. The CNN has 
successfully infiltrated the pillars of the GPH using political deceptions and maneuvering. 
The CNN has taken advantage of the weak governance and traditional political culture in 
accessing sensitive government positions. They serve as sleeper cells ready to be tapped 
for use by the CNN in pursuance of their strategic goal of stalemating the GPH. For 
instance, the party-list voting system has served in the CNN’s favor. In the course of the 
PH-U.S. alliance, communist-affiliated congressional party lists and politicians manifest 
their strong opposition to the enhancement of the PH-U.S. alliance. The CNN’s active 
united front comprising numerous communist-leaning sectors continue to hound the 
established frameworks and mechanisms of the PH-U.S. alliance. These sectors use 
propaganda, street protests, and other political activities to influence public perception 
and policy decisions threatening the integrity of the alliance. 
In the case of the alliance mechanisms and agreement, the MDT provision 
remains a contentious concern between the Philippines and the United States. This issue 
continues to dampen the effectiveness of the alliance as a whole and the implementing 
mechanisms in particular. The presence of a formal treaty and established mechanisms 
has not spared the alliance from disintegration. The combination of the sovereignty-
security dilemma and the enduring propaganda of the CNN have led to the alliance nadir. 
These issues continue to influence the outlook of the Philippine domestic audience and 
political players, contributing to the failure to achieve the maximum potential of the 
alliance. Furthermore, the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board (MDB-
SEB), the 1998 PH-U.S. VFA, and the 2014 PH-U.S. Enhanced Defense Cooperation 
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Agreement (EDCA) has also disconnected the alliance to different degrees. Anchored on 
the MDT principles, these mechanisms have provided the alliance legal frameworks and 
instruments to confront traditional and non-traditional threats. At the same time, these 
mechanisms pose a constitutional problem. Classified as an executive agreement, several 
political leaders questioned the constitutionality of these mechanisms in which they cited 
the sovereignty-security issue. In several cases, both nations’ representatives have a 
varying interpretation concerning the utility of the agreement and the alliance 
implementing frameworks and mechanisms. 
Moreover, the CNN propaganda offensives clamor for the disbandment of these 
mechanisms, specifically when the United States armed forces members commit 
infractions. Although the alliance and its institutionalized mechanisms promote 
cooperation and interests, the unaddressed issues of the sovereignty-security, the 
constitutionality of the MDT, and the non-conformity with the established terms of 
reference of these mechanisms affect the efficacy of the alliance. Thus, the MDT and the 
numerous mechanisms anchored to it have disconnected from the alliance. These issues 
have created friction between the Philippines and the U.S. governments and have 
impeded the full potential of the alliance.  
In summary, the dynamics of the alliance are a product of the interaction of 
existential threats, the strategic approach of the member states, and the alliance 
mechanisms. Therefore, the future of the alliance depends on the approach of the 
Philippines and the United States in resolving and managing these disconnecting factors. 
In this regard, the following are recommended. 
A. THE CHINA THREAT AND THE SCS DISPUTE 
The threat of China is political in nature, and military coercion as a response to 
China’s strategy in the SCS is not feasible but likely to happen. The current state of the 
AFP inhibits a military approach. The Philippines cannot afford a shooting war with 
China as it considers it a zero-sum game, more to lose and nothing to gain. The ambiguity 
of the MDT prevents an automatic U.S. military response to aid the Philippines. Even if 
the United States responds as stipulated in the MDT, the cost of war and its implications 
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does not surpass the expected benefits. However, the United States must continue to 
strengthen the defense capacity of the Philippines in case of the unforeseen eventuality. 
China’s assertive expansion in the Asia-Pacific, specifically in the SCS, must be resolved 
through diplomatic and legal methods. The issue must be resolved through multilateral 
means because the SCS dispute involves several claimant nations. The diplomatic means 
involve continuous high-level negotiations between disputing states. Concerned parties 
must revive or re-establish existing codes of conduct in the SCS to diminish nation-
claimants provoking actions that could ignite a conflict. The United States must actively 
participate in the diplomatic process by providing avenues or forums in which the 
contending states can negotiate. It must influence its East Asian allies to use established 
regional institutions as a means to draw China to the negotiating table. In the legal aspect, 
the Philippines should continue to pursue its legal offensive. Elevating the legal dispute 
to the international level increases the legitimacy of the Philippine claim. Moreover, this 
action will mitigate China’s military overture in the SCS. Although China shows 
resistance to the arbitration process, the Philippines must pursue its legal offensive with 
persistence as a means to influence other nation states and exemplify the use of the rule 
of law in dispute settlement. 
The alliance must continue to strengthen its aggregate capacity. The Philippines 
should continue to enhance its military ability, and the United States must maintain its 
effort in guiding the development of the AFP’s capacity. The alliance must continue to 
conduct joint training exercises to develop interoperability and competence as a form of 
contingency. 
B. THE PHILIPPINE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY 
In the MDB-SEB, the Philippines and the United States should discuss a 
synchronization of their threat priority. As the top threat to Philippine security and a 
threat that destabilizes the alliance, the CNN could become a priority target. The alliance 
should design strategies individually tailored to undermine the complex nature of the 
CNN. The strategy should be in consonance with the holistic approach that the AFP is 
currently implementing. The GPH and the USG should use the alliance as an added 
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implement in the counterinsurgency operations. The United States should assist the 
Philippines in its capability upgrade and doctrine development specifically directed to the 
CNN. The alliance must use the MDB-SEB to formulate doable strategies specifically 
designed to counter the CNN’s current strategy. The alliance must focus on developing 
the AFP capacity not only in terms of military equipment, but especially on strategy and 
tactics development. Applicable kinetic and non-kinetic strategy must be crafted, and the 
alliance should delve into developing the analytical capability of the AFP by introducing 
useful analytical techniques, tools, and training professed by the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) lab as a supplement to 
traditional analytical methods. Furthermore, the alliance could modify the effective and 
recognized counterinsurgency models to act as a feasible template in addressing the threat 
of the CNN. Taking a cue from its success in the GWOT in the Southern Philippines, the 
United States, and the Philippines should maintain a low signature profile. The reason for 
this is to pre-empt the current thrust of the CNN in which political struggle is their key 
strategy. The GPH must expect that the CNN will heighten its propaganda war and legal 
offensive against the established government and the alliance. The alliance must develop 
the AFP to excel in the information dominance field to counter the CNN’s propaganda. 
An information campaign or counter-propaganda must be the center of effort at the 
tactical level of countering the CNN’s narrative. 
The AFP should continue to pressure the NPA through focused combat operations 
to dominate the battle zone and frustrate planned strategic moves. The AFP must focus 
on its established mandate while encouraging its government counterparts to strategize 
against their corresponding CNN component. In this case, the CNN components—the 
CPP, the NDF, and the NPA—must be confronted by the precise government component 
to undermine them efficiently. The GPH must take advantage of the unabated terror acts 
of the NPA to elevate the CNN’s status as a terrorist group. In doing this, the GPH would 
create a significant maneuvering space to further weaken the CNN specifically the NPA. 
The CNN falls under the category of terrorism as defined in the article “The Definition of 
Terrorism,” where Charles L. Ruby states, 
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Terrorism is defined by Title 22 of the U.S. Code as politically motivated 
violence perpetrated in a clandestine manner against noncombatants. 
Experts on terrorism also include another aspect in the definition: the act is 
committed in order to create a fearful state of mind in an audience 
different from the victims. Whether or not an act is considered terrorism 
also depends on whether a legal, moral or behavioral perspective is used to 
interpret the act. If a legal or moral perspective is used, the values of the 
interpreter are the focus rather than the act itself. A behavioral perspective 
appears to be best suited for interpreting and reacting to terrorism.279 
Most importantly, the alliance should make a concentrated effort in the counter-
terrorist financing operations domain. Targeting the CNN financial network through a 
combined, concentrated effort using the alliance would increase the probability of 
weakening the insurgency. Strengthening the counter-financing effort would weaken the 
CNN. The GPH must add counter-financing operations as an additional component of its 
recent shift in strategy. It is essential that the GPH concentrate on undermining the 
CNN’s financial capacity. The CNN’s unrestrained financial capacity serves as the blood 
of the insurgency that sustains its resiliency. The GPH’s concentrated effort on the armed 
component of the CNN and appeasing the people has ignored the lifeline of the 
insurgency. A paradigm shift on strategy against the CNN is necessary. The government 
must reinforce its counter-financing terrorism measures to ensure a nationwide level 
monitoring and counter action against the CNN. Likewise, the GPH must guarantee a 
prompt coordination and unity of effort with its foreign counterparts to enhance the 
efficiency of the strategy. The GPH must address the loopholes and gaps in enacted 
terrorism financing laws to mitigate the CNN’s flexibility. 
The GPH must design a holistic counter-finance strategy in order to provide an 
efficient and unified effort against the CNN. The CNN is a well-organized entity 
composed of a political party, a unified front, and an army. In order to disrupt the CNN’s 
network, the GPH must conduct an in-depth study of the organizational structure, 
dynamics, and ties of the CNN. By dissecting the CNN piece by piece, the GPH will be 
able to field appropriate agencies to confront the vast network of the CNN. These 
proposed steps lead to the determination of the right approach in the conduct Counter 
                                                 
279 Charles L. Ruby, “The Definition of Terrorism,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 2, no. 
1 (2002): 9–14. doi:10.1111/j.1530-2415.2002.00021.x.  
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Terrorist Financing (CTF) operations against the CNN. It may further result in the 
formulation of policies, strategies, and doctrines or re-evaluation of the existing ones. 
In addition, an information campaign must complement the CTF. Propaganda is 
the most efficient weapon of the CNN at the grassroots level; thus, it is necessary for the 
operators to expose the financial opportunism of the rebels, especially the leaders, and 
explain to the masses the difference between extortion and revolutionary tax.280 Jun 
Alcover highlighted the importance of a propaganda war in which he argued, “It is 
usually not by force of arms that the communists bring a country down. It is by 
manipulating public opinion to their advantage.”281 Nonetheless, it would entail the 
GPH’s political will, resolve, and consistency of actions and decisions to defeat the CNN 
through counter-financing terrorism operations. 
C. THE MDT AND ITS MECHANISMS 
The resolution of the perceived ambiguity of the MDT requires high-level 
negotiations between Philippine and U.S. officials. From this context, the MDT will 
remain the strategic concern of the alliance. As discussed in this paper, the problem of the 
MDT has lingered throughout the alliance’s history. The author’s recommendation on 
this issue is to conduct an in-depth study on how to resolve the disparity in interpretation 
by the United States and the Philippines. The intent of the author is to highlight that the 
MDT is a disconnecting factor of the alliance that affects the efficiency of the alliance. 
Similarly, the various alliance mechanisms anchored in the MDT will continue to 
function as both connecting and disconnecting factors of the alliance. They bond the 
alliance, which provides an opportunity for the United States and the Philippines to 
confront jointly existential threats. However, these factors are contributing to the 
                                                 
280 Financial opportunism is an act of taking undue advantage financially, which is punishable by 
death in the CNN. In the “pagsisika” or self-revelation, the NPA members in a group meeting confess their 
fault to the movement. A member either confesses to a crime he committed or he will be charged by a 
witness. The author uses this counter propaganda technique against the NPA by exposing the lavish 
lifestyle of a leader or non-remittance of collected money by a leader or a member. This action creates 
mistrust and factions among the local NPA leaders and members. 
281 Jun Alcover, “Know the Enemy,” ANAD Party-list, https://anadpartylist.wordpress.com/useful-
articles/know-the-enemy/.  
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inefficiency of the alliance attributed to the ambiguity of the agreement’s provisions, 
commitments, and terms of reference. 
The PH-U.S. alliance provides an opportunity for the Philippines to develop a 
credible defense capability through U.S. military assistance and combined training. The 
alliance also provides an interim deterrent instrument against direct foreign aggression. It 
serves as a stop-gap measure while the GPH improves its defense capability to a mere 
credible level. Furthermore, it provides the Philippines an increased capacity in the realm 
of human assistance and disaster response, which is very significant for the Philippines. 
The alliance provides the Philippines with an increased efficiency in and capacity for 
confronting jointly challenging effects of natural disasters. Nonetheless, the alliance does 
not assure a quick or reliable solution to all existential threats. However, the partners 
must interpret that the purpose of the alliance is not to end the threats, but rather to 
manage them properly and reduce these threats to an insignificant level. The Philippines 
and the United States must continue to nurture their alliance. The removal of the gray 
areas of the alliance mechanisms through a combined effort of the partners ensures the 
further strengthening of the PH-U.S. alliance. At any rate, the Philippines must continue 
to expand its diplomatic influence by reaching out to other rising Asian states to raise its 
stature in the international political arena. The GPH must continuously assess its 
international political ties and exercise flexibility, and if possible, circumvent bilateralism 
that hinders its potential to become a full-fledged member of the international 
community. 
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